Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits by Bryant, Taimie
San Diego Law Review 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Taimie Bryant, Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits, 57 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 147 (2020). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol57/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 






    
 
 








I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................148 
II. SOCIOCULTURAL AND LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO AID IN DYING..................158 
III. AID-IN-DYING NONPROFIT APPROACHES TO AID IN DYING ......................167 
A. Utilization of Federal and State Constitutional Free  
 Speech Rights.................................................................................171 
B. State Medical Aid-in-Dying Statutes ..............................................177 
C. Judicial Opinions as a Basis for Protecting Patients’ Rights  
of Access to Aid in Dying ...............................................................186 
IV. TAX-EXEMPT STATUS REQUIREMENTS OF AID-IN-DYING
 NONPROFITS ............................................................................................193 
A. Violation of Public Policy ..............................................................194 
B. Illegal Conduct ..............................................................................196 
C. Charitable Activity.........................................................................196 
D. Pursuit of Legal Reform.................................................................200 
V. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................208 
* © 2020 Taimie Bryant.  Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  I gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of colleagues at UCLA Law who participated in a faculty 
workshop and commented on a draft of this manuscript.  Thanks, also, to the following: 
Judy Neall Epstein, M.D., founder and President of End of Life Choices California; Silvan 
Luley and Ludwig A. Minelli of Dignitas; Robb Miller, former Executive Director and former 
Board Member of End of Life Washington, and contributor to the drafting of Washington’s 
Death with Dignity Act; and Robert Rivas, General Counsel for Final Exit Network.  All 
of these individuals readily and generously shared their extraordinary knowledge and 
thoughtful perspectives on the subjects covered by this Article, including commenting on 
drafts of the manuscript.  Robert Rivas’s 2015 state-by-state survey of assisted suicide 
prohibitions was the starting point for research by Stephanie Anayah, Reference and 
Williams Institute Librarian, UCLA Law Library, who updated the survey and found 
relevant case law, articles, and books.  Lynn McClelland, Reference Librarian, UCLA Law 
Library, confirmed the accuracy of my assertions about legal rules governing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
public benefit organizations and provided valuable additional research assistance. 
 147








   
 
 













     
    
A. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits and the Stigma of Suicide ....................... 209 
B. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits and the Challenge of Respecting
the Autonomy of Individuals Embedded in Social Networks .......... 213 
C. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits’ Role in the Context of
Self-Administration of Life-Ending Medications ............................ 219 
D. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits and the Future of Medical Aid 
 in Dying ......................................................................................... 220 
I. INTRODUCTION
As a recently married young woman in love with the opportunities of
life, Brittany Maynard had every reason to want to live and no reason at
all to wish to die.1  Then, in the wake of a diagnosis of aggressive, incurable
brain cancer, everything changed.2  Brittany came to understand that life
would bring excruciating pain and seizures before death released her.3 
She cared, also, about the toll those changes would take on her family.4 
Because medical science offered little, Brittany chose to move from 
California to Oregon where she could lawfully receive a life-ending dose
of medication from a licensed physician.5  At that time, Oregon was one
of only five jurisdictions where physicians could write such a prescription 
without fear of prosecution for homicide or assisting a patient to commit 
suicide.6  Aid-in-dying7 nonprofits played active roles in advancing those
1. See Brittany Maynard, My Right to Death with Dignity at 29, CNN (Nov. 2, 
2014, 10:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/opinion/maynard-assisted-suicide-
cancer-dignity/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZX2E-HRLR]; see also Belinda Luscombe, 
Why a Young Woman with Brain Cancer Moved to Oregon to Die, TIME (Oct. 8, 2014), 
https://time.com/3481599/brittany-maynard-death-with-dignity-oregon-right-to-die-law 
[https://perma.cc/2WPH-4LEY].




 6. Id.; see Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897
(2018). At that time, the other two jurisdictions besides Oregon with state statutory laws 
allowing physicians to prescribe lethal dose prescriptions to qualified individuals were 
Vermont and Washington.  Patient Choice at End of Life Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§§ 5281–93 (2019); Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010– 
.904 (2019).  At that time, the option was also available in Montana and New Mexico by 
judicial decision, but the New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently decided in 2016 that 
patients do not have a constitutional right to receive physician assistance with dying.  
Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836, 857 (N.M. 2016).  The Montana Supreme Court 
decided that there is no constitutional right to assistance but that patient consent to receive a 
lethal dose prescription would shield the physician from legal liability for knowingly 
providing a lethal dose prescription.  Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1211–222 (Mont. 2009). 
7. For purposes of this Article, “aid in dying” is a general term I define as
assistance to enable one to avoid irremediable end-of-life suffering by ending one’s life.  
It does not include palliative care or patient-directed withholding of care or voluntary 
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legal opportunities for terminally ill individuals, and many, such as Death
with Dignity National Center and Compassion & Choices, also provide 
direct client services.8 
According to Brittany’s mother, Brittany relied on Death with Dignity
National Center for assistance using Oregon’s law.9  Then, with the hope
of making the same opportunity available for others in her home state,
Brittany partnered with Compassion & Choices to speak often, passionately, 
 
and persuasively for enactment of a medical aid-in-dying law in California.10 
She persevered with advocacy and fulfilling her “bucket list” until her
quality of life deteriorated to the point that she chose to die.11 
After Brittany’s death on November 1, 2014, her family, along with
nonprofits Compassion & Choices and Death with Dignity National Center, 
stopping of eating and drinking (VSED).  This Article considers aid in dying in two contexts: 
physician-assisted aid in dying, in which a physician provides a lethal dose prescription to 
a qualified individual; and aid in dying provided by a nonprofit that supplies information
and companionship, but no physical means of ending life, to qualified individuals.  The 
former goes by various names, including aid in dying (AID), medical aid in dying (MAiD),
physician-assisted death (PAD), and physician-assisted suicide (PAS).  I use the term
MAiD (medical aid in dying) to distinguish it from assistance that does not involve a 
physician’s providing a lethal dose prescription.  I use the term “assisted dying” when referring
to the second type of assistance in which the nonprofit does not provide the means to cause 
death. I do not use the term “assisted suicide” because of the differing state statutory 
definitions of that term and because of sociocultural bias associated with the term.  I use 
the term “aid in dying” as the general category including both MAiD and assisted dying. 
8. About Us, COMPASSION & CHOICES, http://Compassionandchoices.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/M497-ATLF].
9. E-mail from Deborah Ziegler, to Taimie Bryant, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch.
of Law (Nov. 9, 2019, 4:14 PM) (on file with author). 
10. Dean Schabner, Brittany Maynard, Advocate for Death with Dignity, Ends her 
Life, ABC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2014, 9:50 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/brittany-
maynard-advocate-death-dignity-ends-life/story?id=26644431 [https://perma.cc/2M59-ES9G].
11. Id.; see also Dan Hirschhorn, Terminally Ill Woman Who Planned Assisted Suicide 
Dies, TIME (Nov. 2, 2014, 9:28 PM), https://time.com/3553770/brittany-maynard-dies/ 
[https://perma.cc/S4BK-TCTE].
 149
BRYANT_57-1_BRYANT FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2020 7:27 PM    
 
 





     
 
 





      











continued Brittany’s legacy of advocacy.12 California’s End of Life Option 
Act came into effect about one and a half years later on June 9, 2016.13 
As compelling as Brittany’s story was to the many who supported her 
decisions, there was no shortage of critics.  Some opponents, such as the 
Catholic Church and the National Right to Life Committee, are legally
organized as nonprofits and advocate to prevent the development of aid-
in-dying opportunities. They question the beliefs that the life Brittany led
was hers to end and that it was compassionate to help her avoid suffering 
through assistance to end her life.14  The National Right to Life Committee 
goes further in its position against aid in dying, arguing that a “right to 
die” could be understood as a “duty to die,” when one seeks to avoid 
12. Judy Lin, Brittany Maynard Speaks from the Grave, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Mar. 25, 2015, 11:56 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2015/03/25/ 
brittany-maynard-video-supports-california-aid-in-dying-bill [https://perma.cc/3SMX-
ECT9] (describing efforts of Debbie Ziegler, the mother of Brittany Maynard, and Dan 
Diaz, Maynard’s husband, in support of legislation proposed in California to allow doctors 
to prescribe life-ending medication to terminally ill patients); see also “What Brittany Asked Us
to Do”: Deborah Ziegler’s Advocacy for Death with Dignity Honors a Promise to Her
Daughter, DEATH WITH DIGNITY (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.deathwithdignity.org/news/ 
2017/10/brittany-asked-us-deborah-zieglers-advocacy-death-dignity [https://perma.cc/
AE46-7Z4X]; BRITTANY MAYNARD FUND, http://thebrittanyfund.org/?nlb=1 [https://perma.
cc/N8XZ-AC36].
13. California’s End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443– 
443.22 (Deering 2019); see Assemb. B. 15, 2015–2016 Leg., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 
2015) (providing that California’s End of Life Option Act was approved by the Governor 
on October 5, 2015). 
14. See, e.g., Kelly Stewart, Arguments Against Brittany Maynard’s Assisted Suicide 
Ignore Her Point of View on Suffering, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.
ncronline.org/blogs/grace-margins/arguments-against-brittany-maynards-assisted-suicide-
ignore-her-point-view [https://perma.cc/A9KY-MKZB] (enumerating various Catholic
perspectives such as “death with dignity” as promoting “false sense of compassion,” 
“cheapening of human life,” avoidance of personal responsibility to others, and a “slippery 
slope” into eugenics and euthanasia); see also Josephine McKenna, Pope Warns Against 
the ‘False Sense of Compassion’ in Euthanasia, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://religionnews.com/2014/11/17/pope-warns-false-sense-compassion-euthanasia [https://
perma.cc/WHP5-4BJT]; Jason Welle, On Love and Dignity and Dying, JESUIT POST (Oct. 
16, 2014), https://thejesuitpost.org/2014/10/on-love-and-dignity-and-dying [https://perma.cc/
F4L6-HNNW] (arguing that there is dignity in suffering at the end of life); Phyllis Zagano, 
A Woman’s Right to Choose?, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.ncronline. 
org/blogs/just-catholic/womans-right-choose?_ga=2.102993152.1285436599.1562539575-
1932076566.1562539575 [https://perma.cc/U4HM-5NVF] (focusing on Brittany Maynard as
exemplifying a pernicious trend in giving people an immoral and unethical prerogative to 
end life).  Shortly after Maynard’s death, the National Right to Life Committee issued a 
statement saying, “These [“Death with Dignity”] laws do not offer a patient ‘dignity’ but 
only abandonment from health care workers and family who are supposed to care for patients 
and loved ones in these dire times.”  Jolie Lee, More Attention to Right-to-Die Debate After 
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burdening others.15  Many believe that sufficient palliative care options 
should have been available,16 and at least one terminally ill individual 
wrote to Brittany to implore her to reconsider.17 
In fact, the idea of ending one’s life for quality of life reasons draws 
considerable morally based opposition.  For instance, a prominent disability
rights nonprofit organization argues that the aid-in-dying movement
implies that some lives, notably those lived with disabilities, are not worth 
living.18  There are also objections based on pragmatic concerns, such as
15. Burke J. Balch & Randall K. O’Bannon, Why We Shouldn’t Legalize Assisting 
Suicide: Part III: What About the Terminally Ill?, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE (Jan. 1, 2013), https:// 
www.nrlc.org/medethics/asisuid3/ [https://perma.cc/UKP8-GMRW]. 
16. According to the Institute of Medicine, pain management care is underdeveloped in
the United States.  See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DYING IN AMERICA: 
IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 
(2015); JESSICA NUTIK ZITTER, EXTREME MEASURES: FINDING A BETTER PATH TO THE END 
OF LIFE (2017) (providing palliative care physician Dr. Zitter’s description of hurdles to 
provision of palliative care options when such options are seen as alternatives to aggressive 
treatment); Lachlan Forrow, Brittany Maynard Highlights Our System’s Tragic Failures, 
BOSTON.COM (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.boston.com/culture/health/2014/11/03/brittany-
maynard-highlights-our-health-care-systems-tragic-failures [https://perma.cc/F9N7-6FSM]
(arguing that, while he opposes medical assistance to hasten death, Brittany Maynard’s 
choice is understandable because the “gold standard” of end-of-life palliative care has not 
been achieved).  Some believe that Brittany Maynard’s situation and advocacy for the right 
to request physician assistance in dying invigorated discussion and improvement in 
palliative care options.  See Lisa Schencker, Assisted-Suicide Debate Focuses Attention 
on Palliative, Hospice Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 16, 2015, 1:00 AM), https://www. 
modernhealthcare.com/article/20150516/MAGAZINE/305169982/assisted-suicide-debate-
focuses-attention-on-palliative-hospice-care [https://perma.cc/N9HV-N2RY].  The National 
Hospice and Palliative Care Organization argues that some medical situations, such as that 
of Brittany Maynard, involve high risk of unmanageable pain.  Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. 
DeMarco, Palliative Care and Patient Autonomy: Moving Beyond Prohibitions Against 
Hastening Death, 9 HEALTH SERVICES INSIGHTS 37 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC5147517 [https://perma.cc/HSD9-8MBN].
17. Daniel E. Slotnik, Brittany Maynard, ‘Death with Dignity’ Ally, Dies at 29, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/us/brittany-maynard-
death-with-dignity-ally-dies-at-29.html [https://perma.cc/4ERT-GDKK].
18. Disability Perspective Aired in Brittany Maynard Media Coverage, NOT DEAD 
YET (Nov. 4, 2014), http://notdeadyet.org/2014/11/disability-perspective-aired-in-brittany- 
maynard-media-coverage.html [https://perma.cc/4WQY-NMEJ].  Not Dead Yet, a disability 
rights group, opposed aid-in-dying laws for a few reasons, including devaluation of lives 
lived with disability and the inadequacy of aid-in-dying laws to protect vulnerable people.  
Id.; see Lee, supra note 14 (describing the position of disability rights group Not Dead Yet 
as generally opposing the aid-in-dying laws and specifically criticizing the laws as containing 
inadequate safeguards and other critics of the availability of medical aid-in-dying). 
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ready access to lethal dose prescriptions by those for whom the prescription 
is not intended, once the patient has filled the prescription.19 
Perhaps the overarching fear Brittany’s decision raises is that, for every 
story like Brittany’s, there is another story that plays differently: What 
about the person who begged her physician for assistance to die but changed 
her mind before irreversibly ending her life, or the person who is grateful 
that her attempt to die was not successful?  What about the person who, 
unlike Brittany’s physician, “assists” another by urging them to complete
an act they had long promised to commit but who would not, but for that 
urging, have completed the life-ending act?  How can anyone be sure that 
“assistance” did not shade into “encouragement,” and how can anyone
know whether an assistant actually had self-interested motives for helping?
And, what should we think of decisions borne of a fear that the individuals 
would become a burden to those caring for them or for the purpose of not 
depleting the family’s finances with expensive medical treatments?  Although
the public seems now to generally support aid in dying,20 the specifics of
individual cases are troubling, and concerns about possible misuse of the 
legal option or people’s choice of death to relieve others’ burdens makes 
crafting the best possible law difficult.  Termination of a life is not, after 
all, reversible. 
Brittany’s situation and the strong activism of nonprofits advancing and 
opposing aid in dying highlights both societal discomfort with the idea of 
choosing to end one’s life and the fact that modern medical science has 
become good at prolonging life but not as good at ensuring quality of life 
19. Other possibilities opponents raise include illegal administration of the drugs to 
a patient who had qualified but was not yet ready to ingest it and the possibility of insurance 
companies’ encouraging and covering life-ending medications in order to save the costs of care.  
See Marina Villeneuve, Maine Becomes 8th State to Legalize Assisted Suicide, AP NEWS 
(June 12, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/7f0fe9d789294a02852c1669c892f382 [https://
perma.cc/GA9Y-PCB7].
20. Art Swift, Brittany Maynard’s Story and Americans’ Views on Assisted Suicide, 
GALLUP (Nov. 5, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/queue/179159/brittany-maynard-story- 
americans-views-assisted-suicide.aspx [https://perma.cc/EH6B-YFVE] (describing poll
results as generally favoring assisted dying but the degree of support is dependent on how 
questions about “assisted suicide” are worded).  Some polls reflect more of an equal division 
between those who support and those who do not.  For instance, a 2013 poll by the Pew 
Research Center reflected 47% in favor and 49% opposed, but as discussed above it is 
difficult to know how people are thinking because the wording of polling questions can have a 
significant impact.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., VIEWS ON END-OF-LIFE MEDICAL TREATMENTS 
31 (2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2013/11/end-of-life-
survey-report-full-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9N6-GFBE].  Moreover, 65% of medical care
professionals in Massachusetts polled shortly after Maynard’s death opposed medical aid 
in dying.  Deborah Kotz, Mixed Medical Views on Brittany Maynard’s Choice to Die: Advocacy 
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all the way to life’s end.21  Palliative end-of-life care cannot relieve all types 
of terminal condition pain,22 and irremediable existential angst associated
with loss of autonomy and dignity can be profoundly difficult to endure.23 
Prolonged suffering of various kinds at the end of life has become more 
common because medical science helps individuals live long enough to
experience suffering for longer periods of time.24  Better palliative care 
would seem to be the answer, but if loss of autonomy is a primary factor 
in the decision to die sooner than would occur naturally, better palliative 
care may not be sufficient for all seekers25 of aid in dying.
Ending one’s life can be a tragically rational response to prolonged end-
of-life suffering from physical and existential causes, yet suicide is heavily
21. See generally ZITTER, supra, note 16. 
22. Graham Winyard & Liza Macdonald, The Limits of Palliative Care, 349 BRIT. 
MED. J., at g.4285 (2014), https://www.bmj.com/content/349/bmj.g4285.full [https://perma.cc/ 
EE3N-LXCY]; see ZITTER, supra, note 16, at 61, 305–08; Eric Metcalf, When Your Pain
Medication Isn’t Working, WEB MD, https://www.webmd.com/pain-management/features/
when-pain-medications-not-working#1 [https://perma.cc/RS6J-JWFV] (describing the
insufficiency of pain medications and the need to find alternative means of reducing pain).  
Even if pain could be relieved, other types of suffering may not be.  See, e.g., Lindsey
Bever, How Brittany Maynard May Change the Right-To-Die Debate, WASH. POST (Nov.
3, 2014, 3:10 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/03/
how-brittany-maynard-may-change-the-right-to-die-debate-after-death/?noredirect=on &utm_ 
term=.6b13bdc9a168 [https://perma.cc/WJM2-9GJ8] (quoting Barbara Coombs Lee of
Compassion & Choices: “[Palliative care is] not a miracle.  And it cannot prevent the kind 
of relentless, dehumanizing, horrific decline that Brittany faces, where her disease will 
cause unending seizures and headaches and nausea and vomiting and pressure in her brain, 
and the loss of every bodily function, including thinking and moving.”). 
23. Indeed, loss of autonomy and dignity rank higher for many patients than the 
experience of severe physical pain.  For instance, Mark A. O’Rourke, M. Colleen O’Rourke, 
and Matthew F. Hudson cite to a report that participant request for medical assistance in 
dying at the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance were due to “loss of autonomy (97.2%), inability 
to engage in enjoyable activities (88.9%), and loss of dignity (75.0%)” as a reason to oppose 
provision of aid-in-dying, arguing that these factors can be addressed without acceding to 
patient requests to receive aid in dying.  Mark A. O’Rourke, M. Colleen O’Rourke & Matthew 
F. Hudson, Editorial, Reasons to Reject Physician Assisted Suicide/Physician Aid in Dying, 13
J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 683, 684 (2017) (citing Loggers ET et al., Implementing a Death with 
Dignity Program at a Comprehensive Cancer Center, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED 1417 (2013)). 
24. See, e.g., ZITTER, supra note 16, at 303–04. 
25. See Pam Oliver, “Another Week? Another Week! I Can’t Take Another Week”: 
Addressing Barriers to Effective Access to Legal Assisted Dying Through Legislative, 
Regulatory and Other Means 65 (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Auckland), http://hdl.handle.net/2292/29864 [https://perma.cc/4ARE-FZ9Q] (“To avoid 
repetition of phrases, people seeking AD [assisted dying] are called ‘seekers’, reflecting their 
quest for a hastened death, whether or not they ultimately choose or achieve an assisted 
death.”). 
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stigmatized and is difficult to do. Little assistance is available to those 
seeking to end their lives with dignity.  Against a backdrop of sociocultural 
fears of dying, let alone by a socially stigmatized act of suicide, “rational
suicide” can seem an oxymoron.26  Against a backdrop of legal penalties
for assisting another to commit suicide, helping a person to die—whether 
that death is rational or not, or understood as “hastening death” and not 
suicide—is a radical concept and a dangerous act.  And yet, the mission 
of several American nonprofits is to move the idea of rational suicide from 
the margins of society to the mainstream, as an acceptable response to
certain life conditions. Often they choose to do that with political rhetoric 
vehemently distinguishing use of medical aid in dying through self-
administration of a life-ending dose of medication from suicide, despite
the fact that suicide is often also accomplished through self-administration
of a life-ending dose of medication. Unfortunately, that subjects such
organizations to criticisms of incoherence and of increasing the stigma 
associated with suicide through claims that people who use medical aid in 
dying should not be “lumped” with suicidal individuals because doing so
would “offend” and “derogate” people using medical aid in dying.27 
26. See SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL LAWS: EXAMINING CURRENT
APPROACHES TO SUICIDE IN POLICY AND LAW 323–30 (2016).  Indeed, some aid-in-dying 
nonprofits reject the term “suicide” in the context of ending end-of-life suffering, preferring 
instead to call it “hastening death.”  Compassion & Choices, End of Life Choices California, 
and End of Life Liberty Project use the term hastening death.  E.g., Rebecca Thoman, 
Compassion & Choices Praises American Academy of Neurology for Dropping Opposition to 
Medical Aid in Dying, COMPASSION & CHOICES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://compassionand
choices.org/news/compassion-choices-praises-american-academy-neurology-dropping-
opposition-medical-aid-dying/ [https://perma.cc/Q3MT-DSK7]; End of Life Liberty Project, 
CASCADIANOW!, https://www.cascadianow.org/end-of-life-liberty-project [https://perma.cc/
J4GU-2MHH]; Natural Death, END LIFE CHOICES CAL., https://endoflifechoicesca.org/
end-of-life-choices/natural-death [https://perma.cc/938E-JEHS].  Other aid-in-dying nonprofits, 
such as Final Exit Network, use the term suicide either because it is a generally understood 
word for an individual’s autonomous act to end life or, like Dignitas – To live with dignity 
– To die with dignity, because the organization believes that the cultural content of the
term suicide must be changed to reflect compassionate acceptance of suicide in the context 
of irremediable suffering. E.g., Our Service, DIGNITAS, http://www.dignitas.ch/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=6&Itemid=47&lang=en [https://perma.cc/MC3V-
7S4D]; FINAL EXIT NETWORK, http://www.finalexitnetwork.org [https://perma.cc/M4CC-
V4YC].
27. See generally Michael Cholbi, Whatever Happened to the Right to Die?
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  Cholbi carefully parses the alleged 
differences between those seeking suicide and those seeking medical aid in dying and finds 
that there is no meaningful difference between the two populations.  See id. at 8.  Both 
terminally ill and suicidal people are susceptible to depression and anxiety, value autonomy, 
seek to end life in expectation of poor quality of life as much as existing poor quality of 
life, and are willing to use death as a means to an end.  See id. at 7–9.  While acknowledging 
that the approach of aid-in-dying nonprofits has short-term political efficacy, he concludes 
that “assisted dying for the terminally ill is suicide tout court.”  Id. at 12. 
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Nonprofits have been relatively good at promoting change in norms.  In
the introduction to their book, The Nonprofit Organization: Essential Readings, 
editors David L. Gies, J. Steven Ott, and Jay M. Shafritz note that: 
Repeatedly through history, citizens have recognized a need and then built a 
nonprofit constituency dedicated to ameliorating or eliminating it, even though
the issue or its targeted people often were socially undesirable (at the time).  In
instance after instance over the years, this voluntary process has led to eventual 
public policy changes and government support (or tolerance) for what was originally 
a politically unacceptable cause, case, or issue.28 
Among their other roles and functions,29 nonprofits are the organizational 
structure through which people come together to promote recognition of 
and solutions for social problems. Gies, Ott, and Shafritz provide the example 
of activism beginning in the 1960s on behalf of people with developmental 
disabilities.30  Feminism and civil rights are but two more examples of ideas
that have shifted, with the significant help and vigilance of nonprofits, from 
the margins to the center of American values.31  However, normative 
transitions do not happen without considerable resistance, collective soul-
searching, and incomplete realization for long periods of time. At any 
28. David L. Gies, J. Steven Ott & Jay M. Shafritz, Introduction to The Nonprofit 
Organization: Essential Readings, at xxiv (David L. Gies, J. Steven Ott & Jay M. Shafritz 
eds., 1990).
29. Sociologist David Horton Smith discusses ten types of impact nonprofits have
on society, resulting in a nonprofit sector through which social change can occur.  See 
generally David Horton Smith, The Impact of the Volunteer Sector on Society, in THE 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS, supra note 28, at 347. 
30. Gies, Ott & Shafritz, supra note 28, at xxiv.  Sociologist David Horton Smith identifies 
a “central impact” of nonprofits being the provision of: 
[S]ociety with a large variety of partially tested social innovations [and] . . . the 
prototyping test bed of many, perhaps most, new social forms and modes of human 
relations. . . . Nearly every function currently performed by governments . . . was 
once a new social idea and the experiment of some voluntary group, formal or 
informal—this is true of education, welfare, care for the aged, building roads, 
even fighting wars (volunteer citizen militias). 
Smith, supra note 29, at 348. 
31. Peter Dobkin Hall, Historical Perspectives on Nonprofit Organizations in the 
United States, in THE JOSSEY-BASS HANDBOOK OF NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
3, 21 (David O. Renz & Robert D. Herman eds., 4th ed. 2016); see also Cheryl A. Hyde, 
The Hybrid Nonprofit: An Examination of Feminist Social Movement Organizations, 8 J. 
COMMUNITY PRAC. 45, 63 (2000) (considering role and structure of influential feminist 
nonprofits).  Hyde discusses how social movement organizations can change the nature of 
public charity activity, not just participate in substantive advancement of debate on social 
issues. 
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given point in the history of activism, it is difficult to tell if there is 
progress or regress.
This Article examines what that transitional process looks like now in 
the context of aid-in-dying nonprofits’ attempts to make medical aid in 
dying an acceptable, available option for those suffering irremediably at
the end of life.  Although there are nonprofits arrayed on all sides of this 
sociocultural quandary about individual autonomy in ending one’s life,
this Article focuses on particular nonprofits advocating for the availability 
of options for ending one’s life as a legitimate response to irremediable
end-of-life suffering to illustrate the challenges of moving an idea into the
mainstream. The content of opposition emerging from anti-aid-in-dying 
nonprofits, such as the Catholic Church, Americans United for Life, and Not 
Dead Yet, is important, but since oppositional organizations are part of 
retaining the status quo, they are not the focus of this Article about aid-in-
dying nonprofits’ activism and client service provision to change the status
quo.
Part II of this Article describes the legal status quo within which aid-in-
dying nonprofits seek change.  Almost all states explicitly prohibit assisting 
another to commit suicide, without exceptions for special circumstances,
such as a physician seeking to help a patient die sooner in the context of 
irremediable end-of-life suffering.32  The wording of those statutes is 
ambiguous,33 making it difficult to predict whether in any particular case
there would be criminal liability for homicide or for assisting suicide or 
civil liability for wrongful death.  Nevertheless, it is clear that assisting another
to commit suicide is against public policy and against the law in the 
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions. 
Against that legal and sociocultural backdrop of disfavoring assisting 
another to end his or her life and punishing those who do, Part III of this 
Article examines three approaches aid-in-dying nonprofits use to advocate 
for and to actually assist individuals suffering irremediably at the end of 
life.  Those approaches include (1) use of free speech protections to provide 
specific, detailed information to irremediably suffering individuals about
how to end their lives both before and during those individuals’ life-ending 
acts, (2) pursuit of laws that shield physicians and pharmacists from providing
lethal dose prescriptions to qualified patients while also assisting patients to
use those laws when permitted by a jurisdiction, and (3) litigation and 
advocacy in support of legal recognition of the idea that physicians’ provision
of lethal dose prescriptions falls within their discretion as physicians treating
patients with unique circumstances.  Part III reveals the radical nature of 
32. See infra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra Section IV.B.
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aid-in-dying advocacy and client service provision, hurdles aid-in-dying 
nonprofits confront, reasons for delays in societal acceptance of aid in dying, 
and the importance of all three approaches for dealing with different kinds of
situations. 
Nonprofit organizations need funds with which to operate, but the goal 
of changing ideas about aid in dying is not one most commercial financial
lenders would support because of its lack of reliable return on investment.
Instead, aid-in-dying nonprofits count on revenues they raise from donors
through their tax-exempt status in order to advocate for change and provide
client assistance.  Part IV brings into focus the regulatory framework within
which nonprofits seek a status that assists with their financial goals while
also shaping how they can pursue those goals. There are different types of 
tax-exempt organizations that receive varying degrees of exemption from 
taxation.34  Exemption from any type of tax can be understood as a subsidy 
provided by the government.35  Thus, in this context, the public, through
government-provided tax exemptions, can be understood as “subsidizing” 
aid-in-dying nonprofits’ attempts to change the status quo to provide 
opportunities for ending one’s life under certain circumstances. 
This tax subsidy is greatest as to Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) 
organizations because donations to those organizations are tax deductible
as “charitable” gifts,36 which may increase potential contributors’ willingness
to donate.  Yet to obtain and maintain that most preferred status, the missions 
of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) organizations must not violate public 
policy, they may not seek legal change as a primary focus, and they must 
not engage in “substantial” lobbying for legislative reform.37  Part IV describes
34. Bruce R. Hopkins & Virginia C. Gross, The Legal Framework of the Nonprofit 
Sector in the United States, in THE JOSSEY-BASS HANDBOOK OF NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP 
AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 31, at 43, 46–49. 
35. The theory of public subsidy of tax-exempt organizations because they produce 
public goods is prevalent but only one theory of tax-exempt organization status in the 
United States. Rob Atkinson states that traditional subsidy theory is “pretty much the 
foundation of present law,” but also provides an overview of other theoretical perspectives.  
Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, 
and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395, 403–04 (1997); see also Henry Hansmann, The 
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 
YALE L.J. 54, 66 (1981) (“A rather common view of the exemption is that it is a means of 
subsidizing particular services—such as health care, education, research, and aid to the 
poor—that nonprofit organizations often provide.”). 
36. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012). 
37. Id. § 501(c)(3) (“[N]o substantial part of the activities of [the organization]
is . . . attempting to influence legislation . . . .”). 
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those requirements and how aid-in-dying nonprofits comply with those 
requirements, despite the fact that assisting others to die is against the law
or public policy in the vast majority of American jurisdictions.  In fact, all
of the representative organizations discussed in this Article are I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) “educational” organizations through which they can actually 
engage in considerable activism and also provide client services in line 
with their missions of providing services to qualified individuals.  Part IV 
considers how client service provision informs advocacy, but also how it 
limits advocacy; caring about client assistance can result in compromises
in the law that dull its efficacy.
While Part III provides contrasts between aid-in-dying nonprofits, Part 
V focuses on the shared characteristics of many aid-in-dying nonprofit
organizations.  For instance, American aid-in-dying nonprofits do not appear
to directly address sociocultural norms pertaining to suicide per se, even 
as they attempt, in quite different ways, to make ending one’s life more 
accessible to specific individuals suffering at the end of life.  Yet, as philosopher
Michael Cholbi argues, such organizations’ vehemently distinguishing medical 
aid in dying from suicide can further stigmatize suicide and increase its
prevalence.38 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits also share the challenge that it is difficult to 
know if in fact any of their approaches is succeeding in making aid in 
dying at the end of life more accessible.  Nor is it possible, at this point in 
the history of aid-in-dying nonprofit advocacy and client service provision, 
to conclude that one approach is superior.  Indeed, this Article illuminates 
a central problem in nonprofit law and policy: How does one measure the 
progress of a social justice movement while change is in process? 
II. SOCIOCULTURAL AND LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO AID IN DYING
Although suicide is generally viewed through a negative lens,39 it is not
illegal in any state. However, aid-in-dying nonprofits must steer clear of 
directly assisting irremediably suffering individuals to die—no matter
how compelling the reason—because assisting suicide is illegal under the 
great majority of state laws.40  A California court captured commonly offered
38. Cholbi, supra note 27, at 13–14. 
39. See STEFAN, supra note 26, at 323–30; see also Jesse Bering, Sometimes, You 
Won’t Feel Better Tomorrow, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://slate.com/technology/
2019/02/mental-illness-suicide-rational-thought-getting-help.html [https://perma.cc/SLA7-
HAP6] (suggesting a more nuanced appraisal of suicidal decision-making, noting, “[w]hen 
experts are given edited case histories of people who died by suicide without knowing they’ve 
taken their own lives, they are far less likely to see a mental illness”).
40. See infra note 43. 
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rationales for the coexistence of legal tolerance for suicide alongside 
criminal penalties for assisting suicide when it wrote: 
Suicide or attempted suicide is not a crime under the criminal statutes of California
or any state.  The absence of a criminal penalty for these acts is explained by the
prevailing thought . . . that suicide or attempted suicide is an expression of
mental illness that punishment cannot remedy. 
 A majority of states, however, impose criminal penalties upon one who assists
another to commit suicide.  One reason for the existence of criminal sanctions 
for those who aid a suicide is to discourage those who might encourage a suicide
to advance personal motives.  Another reason is the belief that the sanctity of life
is threatened by one who is willing to participate in taking the life of another,
even at the victim’s request.  A third justification is that although the suicide
victim may be mentally ill in wishing his demise, the aider is not necessarily 
mentally ill.
These reasons justify a criminal statute punishing the aiding and encouraging
of suicide, although suicide itself is not illegal.  The state’s interest in such a situation 
involves more than just a general commitment to the preservation of human life. 
[It is important to guard against potential abuses, and] [t]hird parties, even family
members, do not always act to protect the person whose life will end.41 
That judicial opinion is now more than a quarter of a century old, yet it 
is still the “prevailing thought” that suicide is generally an “expression of
mental illness,”42 and the laws prohibiting assisting another to commit
suicide remain as strong as ever.  Out of fifty states, forty-four states currently 
have laws that make “assisted suicide” illegal.43  Of those forty-four, forty-
41. Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 64–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
42. See STEFAN, supra note 26, at 323–30; Bering, supra note 39. 
43. ALA. CODE § 22-8B-4 (2019) (effective Aug. 1, 2017) (ban includes physician-
assisted suicide); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2019) (effective June 3, 2006); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (2019) (effective July 24, 2014); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-10-104, -
106 (2019) (effective July 31, 2007) (bans physician-assisted suicide); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 401 (Deering 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2019)
(effective Aug. 8, 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56 (2019) (effective Oct. 1, 1971); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (2019) (effective July 10, 1995); FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2019); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (2019) (effective July 1, 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 
(2019) (effective June 26, 2019); IDAHO CODE § 18-4017 (2019) (effective July 1, 2011); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-34.5 (West 2019) (effective July 1, 2011); IND. CODE § 35-
42-1-2 (2019) (effective July 1, 2014) (“causing” suicide); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5 (2019) 
(effective July 1, 2014) (“assisting” suicide); IOWA CODE § 707A.2 (2019); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5407 (2019) (effective July 1, 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 
(LexisNexis 2019) (effective July 15, 1994); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (2019) (effective 
June 16, 1995); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 204 (2019) (effective Sept. 19, 2019); MD. CODE 
ANN. § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.329a (2019) (effective Sept. 
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two have criminal prohibitions against “assisting,” while Hawaii makes
“intentionally caus[ing]” a suicide illegal,44 and Virginia has civil penalties
for “assisting” suicide.45  A few criminal bans have been added recently:
Alabama in 2017, Ohio in 2017, and Utah in 2018.46  Seven jurisdictions— 
Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, Wyoming, 
and the District of Columbia—have no statutes specifically criminalizing 
the aiding or assisting in a suicide.  However, many of these jurisdictions 
have policy statements against “mercy killing” or “assisted suicide.”47 
1, 1998) (common law assisted suicide); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (2019) (effective 
Feb. 25, 1993) (criminal assistance to suicide); MINN. STAT. § 609.215 (2019) (effective 
Aug. 1, 1999) (the words severed “advising or encouraging” suicide were held unconstitutional 
by State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014)); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 
(2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
5-105 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (2018)
(effective Nov. 1, 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 2019) (effective Aug. 1, 2019); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (LexisNexis 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 
2019) (effective Sept. 1, 1967) (promoting a suicide attempt); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 
(McKinney 2019) (effective Sept. 1, 1967) (second-degree manslaughter); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.04 (LexisNexis 2019) (effective 
Mar. 21, 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 813 (2019) (aiding suicide); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§ 814 (2019) (furnishing weapon or drug); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (2019) (second
degree manslaughter); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.193 (2019) (assisting suicide; exemptions); 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (West 2019) (effective June 6, 1973); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
60-3 (2019) (ban refers to “[a]n individual or licensed health care practitioner”); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-1090 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-13-216 (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 2019) (effective Sept. 1, 1994); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (LexisNexis 2019) (effective May 5, 2018); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-622.1 (2019) (effective July 1, 2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (2019)
(effective July 22, 2011); WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (2019). . 
44. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (“Manslaughter[:] . . . A person commits the offense of
manslaughter if . . . the person intentionally causes another person to commit suicide . . . .”). 
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-622.1 (“Injunction against assisted suicide; damages; 
professional sanctions.”). 
46. ALA. CODE § 22-8B-4 (including part of the 2017 “Assisted Suicide Ban Act,” 
criminalizing both assistance by individuals and by physicians or health care providers; 
for physicians and health care providers, specifically bans “prescrib[ing] any drug compound, 
or substance to a patient deliberately to aid in dying or assist[ing] or perform[ing] any 
medical procedure deliberately to aid in dying”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.04 (providing 
that “assisting suicide” is a felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (detailing the manslaughter 
statute amended to criminalize assisted suicide). 
47. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 12 (2019) (“Suicide or mercy killing.” “Nothing
in this chapter shall be construed to constitute, condone, authorize, or approve suicide or 
mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act to end one’s own life other 
than to permit the natural process of dying.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449A.475 (2019) (“NRS 
449A.400 to 449A.481 [Withholding or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment], inclusive, 
do not condone, authorize or approve mercy-killing, assisted suicide or euthanasia.”); W. 
VA. CODE § 16-30-15 (2019) (“Nothing in this article shall be construed to legalize, condone, 
authorize or approve mercy killing or assisted suicide.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-414(c) 
(2019) (“This act [Wyoming Health Care Decisions Act] does not authorize mercy killing, 
assisted suicide, euthanasia or the provision, withholding or withdrawal of health care . . . .”). 
160
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Even without statutes, there can be common law prohibitions48 or medical 
practice rules that prohibit physicians from providing assistance.49  Moreover,
a state without an explicit statute may consider assisted suicide a criminal 
act by deeming it within the scope of homicide.50  Also, sometimes a 
“silent” state will have a statute distinguishing lawful passive withholding 
48. See, e.g., In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Cal. 1983) (“At common law, 
an aider and abettor [of the suicide of another] was guilty of murder by construction of 
law because he was a principal in the second degree to the self-murder of the other.” (citing 
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 296 (1957))); People v. 
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Mich. 1994) (“Where a defendant merely is involved in 
the events leading up to the death, such as providing the means, the proper charge is assisting 
in a suicide, which may be prosecuted as a common-law felony under the saving clause [of the 
Michigan statutes, incorporating the common law of crimes] in the absence of a statute 
that specifically prohibits assisting in a suicide.” (citation omitted) (citing MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 750.505 (2019))). 
49. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 147.091(w) (2019) (“The following conduct is prohibited 
and is grounds for disciplinary action: . . . (w) Aiding suicide or aiding attempted suicide in 
violation of section 609.215 . . . .”).  Section 609.215 is Minnesota’s statute criminalizing 
assisted suicide and is part of Minnesota’s criminal code; however, § 147.091 is part of 
the Minnesota Medical Practice Act, setting forth grounds for disciplinary action.  In other 
states, the medical practice statute merely penalizes “unprofessional conduct,” and then 
the state’s ban on assisted suicide will classify physician-assisted suicide as unprofessional 
conduct, thereby opening up the doctor to discipline.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-24-360 
(2019) (giving the Alabama Medical Licensure Commission “the power and duty to suspend, 
revoke, or restrict any license to practice medicine” for commission of various offenses, 
including “unprofessional conduct”); ALA. CODE § 22-8B-5 (2019) (including part of Alabama’s 
“Assisted Suicide Ban Act,” stating that “[a]ny physician or other health care provider who
deliberately aids in dying in violation of this chapter shall be considered to have engaged
in unprofessional conduct for which his or her license to provide health care services in
the state shall be suspended or revoked by the appropriate licensing board”).  Other states,
as part of their criminalization of assisted suicide statute, have provisions covering discipline
for doctors. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(d) (2019) (“Within ten days of a conviction, a
health care provider who is convicted of violating this Code section [criminalization of 
assisting suicide] shall notify in writing the applicable licensing board for his or her licensure . . . .
Upon being notified . . . the appropriate licensing board shall revoke the license . . . or other 
authorization to conduct such health care provider’s occupation.”).  Virginia’s statute makes 
assisted suicide illegal, which provides not criminal but civil penalties.  VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-622.1(D) (2019) (“A licensed health provider who assists or attempts to assist a suicide 
shall be considered to have engaged in unprofessional conduct for which his certificate or 
license to provide health care services in the Commonwealth shall be suspended or revoked by
the licensing authority.”).
50. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-107 (2019) (“Criminally negligent homicide. 
(a) Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-106 [Homicide by vehicle], 
a person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another person 
by conduct amounting to criminal negligence.”). 
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of life support in a way that leaves open the possibility that actively
assisting suicide will be determined unlawful.51 
Much turns on what constitutes “assisting” another to commit suicide. 
When aid-in-dying nonprofits provide information to people seeking aid 
in dying, are they “assisting” that person to commit suicide?  When a patient 
has a conversation with a physician about a strong desire to end her life, 
is the physician assisting her by having that conversation or by providing
a prescription that the patient subsequently uses as part of a suicide plan? 
Statutory clarity is possible in this area of law.  For instance, Arizona’s
statute provides that “[a] person commits manslaughter by . . . [i]ntentionally 
providing the physical means that another person uses to commit suicide,
with the knowledge that the person intends to commit suicide.”52 There
may be evidentiary problems, but Arizona’s law steers clear of imperiling 
those who provide nothing other than education about such things as methods 
and risks.  An aid-in-dying nonprofit that provides only information will not 
be successfully prosecuted under that law, no matter how specific the 
information provided or how closely the actions subsequently taken by 
the recipients follow the information they received.
Arizona’s statutory clarity is not the norm, however.  Among the forty-
four states that explicitly prohibit “assisting” or “causing” “suicide,”53 it 
is not easy to decide definitively whether the statute would be violated in 
a particular situation, due to the lack of definitions for terms used in the 
statutes. This ambiguity could lead physicians to hesitate even to provide 
adequate pain relief to a severely and irremediably suffering patient, 
particularly if the patient has asked repeatedly for a prescription with 
which the patient could end the patient’s own life.  Seen from that perspective, 
ambiguous laws seem unkind and ripe for reform.  However, seen from 
the perspective of those concerned about the risks of greater societal receptivity 
to individuals’ ending their lives and about vulnerable individuals making 
irreversible decisions, ambiguous laws seem appropriate to prevent such 
acts by making would-be assistants, including physicians and aid-in-dying 
nonprofits, hesitant to provide help. 
Without clarity comparable to that of Arizona’s law, it would not be
difficult for ambitious prosecutors or prosecutors in a jurisdiction hostile 
to suicide and assisted suicide to exploit statutory ambiguity to charge a
physician who provided prescriptions to a patient who had mentioned a 
51. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 16-30-15 (providing that withholding of life support 
under specified conditions is not assisted suicide or murder and that “[n]othing in this article 
shall be construed to legalize, condone, authorize or approve mercy killing or assisted suicide”). 
52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3) (2019). 
53. See supra note 43. 
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desire to die and had, in fact, stockpiled medications with which to commit
suicide. When would a “reasonable” physician have known a patient’s intent? 
Statutory ambiguity could also result in charging those, including aid-
in-dying nonprofits, who “participate[d]” in another’s suicide by encouragingly
discussing possible methods.54  For instance, South Carolina’s statute limits
criminal culpability to providing the physical means for another to commit 
suicide, the use of force or duress to intentionally cause another to commit 
or attempt to commit suicide, or participation in a physical act by which 
another commits suicide, knowing that the other intends to commit suicide.55 
The statute seems straightforward and to avoid criminalizing the provision
of mere information, stating as follows: 
(A) As used in [South Carolina Code Ann. § 16-3-1090] . . . 
(2) “Suicide” means the act or instance of taking one’s life voluntarily and 
intentionally.
(B) It is unlawful for a person to assist another person in committing suicide.
A person assists another person in committing suicide if the person: 
(1) by force or duress intentionally causes the other person to commit or
attempt to commit suicide; or
(2) has knowledge that the other person intends to commit or attempt to
commit suicide and intentionally:
(a) provides the physical means by which the other person commits
or attempts to commit suicide; or
(b) participates in a physical act by which the other person commits
or attempts to commit suicide.56 
However, like several other states,57 this statute covers “force” and 
“duress,” which could also involve some speech acts.  Massachusetts does 
54. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090(B) (2019). 
55. See id.
 56. Id. § 16-3-1090(A)–(B). There are other state statutes that criminalize “participation” 
in physical acts. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-4017 (2019); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-
34.5 (West 2019); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2, -2.5 (2017) (“assisting” and “causing”); IOWA 
CODE § 707A.2 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5407 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 
(LexisNexis 2019); MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102 (LexisNexis 2019); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3795.04 (LexisNexis 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 (2019); 11 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (2019). 
57. Other states that include “force,” “coercion,” or “duress” as considerations in 
their assisting suicide prohibitions are Kansas, Maryland, and South Carolina.  KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-5407; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-102; S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090. 
Some other states distinguish between assisting a suicide and “causing a suicide” or homicide, 
depending on the presence of force, coercion, or duress, with different penalties associated 
with their different classification.  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2 (“Causing Suicide”); 
IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5 (“Assisting Suicide”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (treating 
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not have a statute specifically prohibiting assisted suicide but provides a
recent example of the sufficiency of speech acts to result in conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter in the context of suicide.58  On February 6, 2019,
a Massachusetts appellate court confirmed the conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter of Michelle Carter, who was accused of repeatedly urging 
her boyfriend to follow through on his stated intent to commit suicide.59 
According to Justice Kafker’s ruling, Carter and her boyfriend were 
communicating by phone as he sat in a truck filling with carbon monoxide
gas.60  When he exited the truck, Carter ordered him to get back into the
truck to complete the suicide and then listened to the sounds of the motor 
producing the carbon monoxide gas and her boyfriend coughing and 
moaning until he fell silent.61 Although she was not near the truck and
had not participated in any physical act, such as purchasing the motor that 
was producing the carbon monoxide gas, Carter was convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter because her “actions and her failure to act,” encouragement 
and not trying to prevent the suicide, was held to constitute “wanton and 
reckless conduct that caused the victim’s death.”62 
How does one draw the line between Michelle Carter’s alleged actions
and those of a nonprofit organization that explains methods and attends 
the death of individuals who use that information?  Final Exit Network’s 
(FEN) words are significantly different from those of Carter’s alleged
texts; FEN does not encourage individuals to commit suicide.63  Yet the 
causing a suicide by force or duress treated as a Class C felony and treating assisting a suicide
without force or duress as a Class D felony). 
58. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 574 (Mass. 2019). 
59. See id. at 571; see also Kayla Epstein, Lindsey Bever & Kristine Phillips, Her 
Texts Urged a Boyfriend to Kill Himself. A Judge Just Upheld Her Conviction, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 6, 2019, 1:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2019/02/06/her- 
texts-urged-boyfriend-kill-himself-judge-just-upheld-her-conviction/?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.b31a96b84b37 [https://perma.cc/DTY8-Y6HU].
60. Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 565. 
61. Id. at 565–66. 
62. Id.; see also Lindsey Bever & Kristine Phillips, Michelle Carter, Who Urged
Her Boyfriend to Commit Suicide, Found Guilty in His Death, WASH. POST (June 16, 2017, 
1:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/06/16/shes-accused-
of-pushing-him-to-suicide-now-a-judge-has-decided-her-fate/?utm_term=.57a6dd900bad 
[https://perma.cc/Y6KW-HENE].  The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Carter’s appeal,
which argued that convicting Carter on the basis of words alone was a violation of the First 
Amendment.  Marc Fortier & Caroline Connolly, US Supreme Court Denies Michelle Carter’s 
Appeal in Texting Suicide Case, NBC BOS., https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/us-
supreme-court-denies-michelle-carters-appeal-in-texting-suicide-case/2061253 [https:// 
perma.cc/8J5H-WPQD] (last updated Jan. 14, 2020, 7:35 AM). 
63. Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), FINAL EXIT NETWORK http://www.final 
exitnetwork.org/Mission.html [https://perma.cc/2X79-7P6J] (“We do not encourage anyone
to end their life and are opposed to anyone encouraging anyone to end their life. We do not 
provide the means for self-deliverance and we do not assist in self-deliverance.”).
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question remains—can words alone ever be enough to convict for “assisting
suicide”; should they be enough?64 
Even without the statutory language of “coercion” and “duress,” the 
South Carolina statute would contain ambiguity because of the undefined 
term “participates” in the phrase “participates in a physical act.”65  Could
there be speech acts, such as taunting an individual to kill herself after she 
has expressed commitment to end her life, that constitute “participation?”  
Could an aid-in-dying nonprofit run afoul of the law by reassuring a person 
that the method it describes will work, if the person hesitates after starting 
to use the method?  What level of proof would be necessary to find that the 
words had been spoken and properly belonged in the category of
“participatory?”
If assisting suicide means only physical acts, such as providing the means 
or helping the person utilize the means, there is sufficient legal protection 
for speech acts to provide information, support, and companionship to
individuals making one of the most important decisions of their lives.66 
64. See Doha Madoni, Michelle Carter, Who Encouraged Boyfriend’s Suicide,
Appeals to the Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (July 8, 2019, 3:20 PM), https://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/michelle-carter-who-encouraged-boyfriend-s-suicide-appeals-supreme- 
court-n1027601 [https://perma.cc/7CCR-C37C] (explaining that Carter contends in her
filing that the court’s decision violates her First Amendment rights); see also Jess Bidgood, 
She’s Accused of Texting Him to Suicide. Is that Enough to Convict?, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/us/suicide-texting-manslaughter-trial.html? 
action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&region=Footer [https://perma.cc/ 
GCK3-3SGL]; Lindsey Bever & Kristine Phillips, Texting Guide Sentencing Provides No
Closure, but Victim’s Mother Declares: ‘We Want to Move On,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2017, 
5:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/08/03/michelle-
carter-whose-texts-pushed-her-boyfriend-to-suicide-to-be-sentenced-in-his-death [https:// 
perma.cc/LZ52-467E]; Kate Taylor, What We Know About the Michelle Carter Suicide 
Texting Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/ 
michelle-carter-i-love-you-now-die.html [https://perma.cc/L924-QZB2].
65. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-1090 (2019). 
66. For Final Exit Network’s arguments in the litigation in which it has been 
involved, see generally Appellants’ Brief, Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 
722 (Ga. 2012) (No. S11A1960), 2011 WL 5289141; Appellants’ Supplemental Brief, 
Final Exit Network, 722 S.E. 2d 722 (No. 211A1960), 2011 WL 5289143; Brief Amicus 
Curiae for Final Exit Network, Inc. & Jerry Dincin & Appendix, Melchert-Dinkel v. State, 
844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2011) (No. A11-0987), 2011 WL 11720916; Appellant’s Brief, 
Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 889 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. 2016) (No. A15-1826), 2016 
WL 8315459; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Final Exit Network, Inc. 
v. Ellison, 370 F. Supp. 3d 995 (D. Minn. 2019) (No. 18-cv-01025), 2018 WL 1858565;
see also Amended Complaint, Final Exit Network, 370 F. Supp. 3d 995 (No. 18-cv-01025); 
Second Amended Complaint, Final Exit Network, 370 F. Supp. 3d 995 (No. 18-cv-01025). 
 165













    
  
    
   
 
However, if the definition of “assistance” includes speech with the intent 
to assist someone the speaker knows is intending to commit suicide, there 
is less opportunity to assist lawfully because aid-in-dying nonprofit 
speakers usually provide specific information when individuals contemplating 
suicide ask them. As will be described below, that is the current situation 
under Minnesota law, with the result that no aid-in-dying nonprofit can 
provide specific information to anyone considering ending his or her life, 
regardless of circumstances.67 
A legislature cannot foresee all possible prosecutions under a particular
law, and without prosecution it is difficult to know if the scope of a state’s 
criminal prohibition of assisted suicide is actually limited to physical acts.
Nonprofits interested in protecting individual autonomy and access to aid 
in dying cannot know in advance if their provision of mere educational 
assistance would survive prosecution. For example, Delaware’s current
law provides as follows: “A person is guilty of promoting suicide when 
the person intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, 
or when the person intentionally aids another person to commit suicide.”68 
Legislation introduced in 2017 would amend the law to define the crime 
of aiding suicide or committing homicide by causing suicide as follows: 
“A person commits an offense if the person knowingly aids another in 
committing suicide,” and “[a] person may be convicted of . . . causing
another person to commit suicide only if the person causes the suicide by 
force, threat, or coercion.”69  It is unclear what would constitute “knowing 
aid” or “force, threat, or coercion.”  When would the outcome of a self-imposed 
death lead to a post hoc characterization of another’s involvement prior to 
that death as force, threat, coercion, or knowing aid?  Surely, the risk is 
greater when suicide as a general matter is strongly stigmatized.  Unfortunately, 
aid-in-dying nonprofits that argue that “lumping” seekers of medical aid 
in dying with seekers of suicide is offensive and hurtful to the former may 
actually increase stigma associated with suicide and actually harm the 
ultimate goal of making aid in dying more available.70 
A state statute that casts even more doubt on what it means to “assist”
a suicide is that of Louisiana, which provides that: 
67. See State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 302–03 (Minn. Ct. App.
2016), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017) (mem.); see also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 
N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014). 
68. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (2019). 
69. S.B. 209, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2018).  The bill died in committee.  
Senate Bill 2019, DEL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/26675 [https://
perma.cc/6K5T-C8TE]. 
70. See Cholbi, supra note 27, at 7. 
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Criminal assistance to suicide is: (1) The intentional advising or encouraging
of another person to commit suicide or the providing of the physical means or
the knowledge of such means to another person for the purpose of enabling the 
other person to commit or attempt to commit suicide.  (2) The intentional 
advising, encouraging, or assisting of another person to commit suicide, or the
participation in any physical act which causes, aids, abets, or assists another person
in committing or attempting to commit suicide.71 
There are multiple opportunities in such a statute for a prosecutor to promote
definitions for statutory terms that include acts in which nonprofits might 
engage to assist a terminally and irremediably suffering individual to die.
The inclusion of providing knowledge of methods by which an individual
could end his or her life means that there could be circumstances under 
which an individual, such as a volunteer for an aid-in-dying organization, 
could be prosecuted for merely informatively describing and discussing 
such options.  In fact, as will be described in more detail later, one aid-in-
dying nonprofit in particular, Final Exit Network, has been prosecuted and 
threatened with prosecution for providing information to individuals with
knowledge of those individuals’ intent to die.72 
III. AID-IN-DYING NONPROFIT APPROACHES TO AID IN DYING
Aid-in-dying nonprofits, like many other public benefit nonprofits 
unwilling to raise funds by charging client service fees and unable to raise 
funds through commercial financial markets,73 must rely heavily on donative
support of various kinds.74 Tax-exempt status provides tax relief of various
kinds to the organization, and the most privileged tax-exempt status, I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3), enables donors to receive tax deductions for their charitable 
contributions.75  Since many donors prefer tax deductibility of their donations,76 
71. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (2019) (emphasis added). 
72. See Final Exit Network, 889 N.W.2d at 301. 
73. Hansmann, supra note 35, at 72 (“[T]he exemption [of nonprofits from taxation]
serves to compensate for difficulties that nonprofits have in raising capital, and . . . such a 
capital subsidy can promote efficiency when employed in those industries in which nonprofit 
firms serve consumers better than their for profit counterparts.”). 
74. See William Landes Foster, Peter Kim & Barbara Christiansen, Ten Nonprofit
Funding Models, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2009, at 32, 32–39.  Aid-in-dying 
nonprofits fall primarily into the “heartfelt connector” and “beneficiary builder” models. 
75.  I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2012). 
76. Receiving a tax deduction for charitable gifts means that a donor can reduce the 
donor’s tax burden and give more.  For example, without considering limits on deductions, 
suppose a donor in the 22% tax bracket gives $1000 to charity.  The taxpayer would pay 
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I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations have the best chance of attracting such 
funding. To attain and maintain that status, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations’ 
activities must be performed for the benefit of the public77 and, therefore, 
cannot violate public policy.78  They cannot engage in illegal activities in 
furtherance of their missions,79 and their missions cannot be primarily about
changing the law.80 
Given these restrictions and the current status of the law described in 
Part II, how can aid-in-dying nonprofits exist as I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations? 
All of the aid-in-dying organizations considered in this Article are I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in significant amounts of activism 
to change the law or how the law is interpreted.81  Part III describes the
approaches and activities of these nonprofits, while Part IV considers in 
more detail why these activities do not disqualify these organizations as 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations. 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) aid-in-dying organizations use three basic legal
approaches, described in more detail in this Part.  One approach is to argue 
that legal prohibitions on assisting suicide cannot be so expansive as to 
preclude exercise of free speech rights under state and federal constitutions 
to provide information to individuals seeking that information.  A good 
example of this approach is Final Exit Network,82 which defends the right
less taxes because she will deduct the $1000 she gave to charity from her adjusted gross 
income before paying the 22% tax on the remaining taxable income. 
77. Exemption Requirements—501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-501c3-organizations 
[perma.cc/3PYW-M88B]; see Exempt Purposes, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-purposes-internal-revenue-code-section-501c3 
[https://perma.cc/3KRE-B2Y9].
78. IRS, ACTIVITIES THAT ARE ILLEGAL OR CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY (1985),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicj85.pdf [https://perma.cc/JML5-43L6]. 
79. See id.
80. Pursuit of legal reform is a legitimate public benefit, but organizations whose primary
purpose is legal reform would not qualify as I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations.  If they meet 
other requirements, they could receive I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) status, which would enable them 
to engage in substantial amounts of legislative lobbying that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations 
cannot undertake.  However, donations to those organizations would not be tax deductible 
under I.R.C. § 170.  See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012). 
81.  This Article does not purport to identify or categorize every aid-in-dying nonprofit 
in the United States.  Organizations were selected for inclusion based on their exemplifying the 
different approaches described in the Article. 
82. Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 63 (“Through our legal efforts
to support people’s right to self-deliverance, we seek to clarify existing laws that are 
ambiguous as to self-deliverance and possibly extend them where appropriate. We retain 
legal counsel with special expertise in end-of-life and free speech issues.”); see also Michael 
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to provide education to people who are suffering without possibility of 
recovery and who have determined rationally—and not as a manifestation
of transient despair or simple tiredness of living—that, all things considered, 
it is best to end their suffering by ending their lives.  Final Exit Network 
limits access to this education by requiring a medical evaluation of an
individual’s claims of irremediable suffering due to a health condition 
unresponsive to medical intervention.83  Final Exit Network does not provide
the means to commit suicide or physically assist in the use of the method 
chosen by an individual to end his or her life; it provides only education 
and if the individual requests, companionship at the time of death.84 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits such as End of Life Washington,85 Death with 
Dignity National Center,86 and Compassion & Choices87 use a second 
approach, although, of course, they also educate those who request information 
about aid in dying.  These organizations advocate for and utilize state medical 
aid-in-dying (MAiD) statutes, laws that create a statutory exception to 
legal prohibitions on assisting suicide.88  Under these laws, a licensed physician 
can lawfully prescribe, and a licensed pharmacist can lawfully fill, a lethal 
dose of medication for a legally and medically qualified patient.89  These 
laws restrict access to only some patients suffering at the end of life, and 
they require physicians to follow multiple steps before and after writing a 
83. Exit Guide Information Request, FINAL EXIT NETWORK,  http://www.finalexit
network.org/Exit-Guide-Services.html [https://perma.cc/6K3K-TLCT] (“Our Medical
Committee evaluates all requests for guide support.  Senior Guides ensure that the applicants 
comply with our official criteria.”). 
84. Id. (“Our guides travel to you and educate you on your personal choices. You
must, however, be able to competently choose, as well as be able to effect your exit.”); see 
also Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 63 (“We hold that a mentally competent 
person with intolerable suffering or pain has the right to end his or her life, choosing the 
timing and persons present, and should be free of any restrictions by the law, clergy, medical 
profession, friends or relatives.”). 
85. About, END LIFE WASH., https://endoflifewa.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/7XJQ-
UNMT].
86. About Us, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/about [https:// 
perma.cc/4ADH-C4F5].
87. About Us, COMPASSION & CHOICES, https://www.compassionandchoices.org/
about-us [https://perma.cc/G9PB-F663].
88. See, e.g., About Us, supra note 86. 
89. See generally How Death with Dignity Laws Work, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https:// 
www.deathwithdignity.org/learn/access [https://perma.cc/LW2U-T8B2].
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lethal dose prescription.90  End of Life Washington assists qualified individuals 
to use the law by, among other things, finding physicians and pharmacists 
willing to consider their requests, providing templates for advance care 
directives, and attending deaths, if requested by the individuals electing to use 
Washington’s Death with Dignity Act.91 End of Life Choices Oregon92 and
End of Life Choices California93 similarly provide assistance to clients seeking 
to use their state laws. Compassion & Choices emphasizes assistance 
to physicians by providing information about compliance with legally required 
steps and appropriate drug formulations.94 
In addition to advocating for MAiD laws and assisting physicians
interested in complying with MAiD statutes, Compassion & Choices also
uses a third approach.  Compassion & Choices and End of Life Liberty
Project argue that a physician’s decision to prescribe a lethal dose of
medication should be legally recognized as a part of standard medical 
practice, that it should be protected as a private matter between a physician 
and a patient, and that such a prescription should not be legally understood 
as “assisting suicide.”95  There have been multiple attempts to secure
declaratory judgments,96 but currently the only example of a state following 
this approach is Montana, where a judge decided that physicians could defend 
themselves from prosecution for homicide by showing patient consent to 
receipt of lethal dose prescriptions.97 
Each of these three approaches is distinct, yet all are quite limited from 
a patient access point of view and require continual advocacy to secure 
90. For a compilation of requirements found in MAiD statutes, see Frequently Asked 
Questions, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/faqs [https://perma.cc/ 
FC5R-ZG45].
91. What We Do, END LIFE WASH., https://endoflifewa.org/about-us/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/7PJ3-M58S].
92. How We Help, END LIFE CHOICES OR., https://eolcoregon.org [https://perma.cc/
C4QN-XUDW].
93. What We Do—Services, END LIFE CHOICES CA., https://endoflifechoicesca.org/
what-we-do/services/ [https://perma.cc/DLE5-VAJW]. 
94. See What is Doc2Doc?, COMPASSION & CHOICES, https://compassionandchoices.
org/d2d [https://perma.cc/WM2V-HTUP].
95. End of Life Liberty Project, supra note 26. 
96. See, e.g., Final Exit Network, Inc. v. Ellison, 370 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 
2019); Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 60–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Myers v. 
Schneiderman, 31 N.Y.S.3d 45, 47 (2016), aff’d, 85 N.E.3d 57 (2017); Second Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Brody v. Harris, No. CGC-15-544806, 
2016 WL 1045794 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016), 2015 WL 10520851; Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 2, Kligler v. Healey, No. SUCV201603 
254F, 2017 WL 2803074 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 31, 2017) (Civ. Action No. 16-3254F); 
Wendy Osher, Circuit Court Dismisses Medical Aid-in-Dying Case, MAUI NOW (July 16, 
2017, 7:47 AM), http://mauinow.com/2017/07/16/circuit-court-dismisses-medical-aid-in-
dying-case [https://perma.cc/B7LF-S7EF]. 
97. See generally Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009). 
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and defend.  Indeed, as the detailed description below suggests, it is difficult 
to decide whether there has been much actual improvement in Americans’ 
access to aid in dying.  This is troubling in light of the 2015 Dying in 
America Report,98 which revealed that Americans do not have consistent
access to palliative care or respect for patient autonomy at the end of life, 
despite significant public support for greater end-of-life choice.99 
A. Utilization of Federal and State Constitutional Free Speech Rights 
To a greater or lesser extent, all aid-in-dying nonprofits utilize free 
speech protection in advocacy and direct client service provision, but 
nonprofits differ as to grounding their organizational activities primarily
in this protection.  Nonprofits working within the framework of a MAiD 
statute are protected not so much by state and federal constitutional free 
speech rights as by the particular MAiD statute in their jurisdiction, which 
allows a patient who qualifies to lawfully receive a lethal dose prescription 
from a physician willing to prescribe it.  If those organizations chose to 
help a client who does not qualify under the statute, they would be wholly 
dependent on free speech protection to provide information sufficient to 
enable those individuals to end their own lives without assistance, as legally
defined under state law. This is a realistic possibility, since MAiD statutes 
do not cover all individuals similarly situated with regard to suffering
irremediably from a terminal medical condition.100 
Final Exit Network is the American nonprofit that most fully utilizes 
free speech protections to assist qualified individuals to end their lives
when experiencing irremediable end-of-life suffering.101  FEN and its volunteers
trained as “exit guides” provide information to qualified individuals about
how to purchase and autonomously use equipment and supplies so that the
individuals themselves can end their lives, without FEN’s participation or 
assistance in their deaths.102 FEN makes a legally significant distinction:
98. See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 16. 
99.  See id. at 25.
 100. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 90. 
101. See generally Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 63. 
102. Final Exit Network medical staff make the determination about whether an 
individual qualifies to receive information about suicide from an exit guide.  See Exit Guide 
Information Request, supra note 83.  Exit guides are trained not to encourage suicide or to 
provide any assistance with the physical acts associated with the suicide.  See Who Is the 
Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 63. 
 171




   
   
 
 













exit guides provide information and may attend the death but do not 
participate in or physically assist the individual.103 
FEN and its exit guides base their actions on some of the most powerful 
laws in the United States: federal and state constitutional freedom of 
speech laws.104  Yet, FEN has been accused of operating “outside the law.”105 
In states with medical aid-in-dying statutes, operating outside the law tends 
to mean outside of the MAiD statute.106  Even in states without such laws,
FEN has been accused of operating outside the law because assisting another 
to commit suicide is a common criminal prohibition.107 
Whether FEN is actually operating outside the law depends on relevant 
legal definitions, such as “suicide,” “assisting suicide,” “death/dying,” and
“education.”  For instance, some argue that the border between the right to 
provide information and assisting suicide could lie in the legal definition 
103. Exit Guide Information Request, supra note 83 (“Our guides travel to you and
educate you on your personal choices.  You must, however, be able to competently choose, 
as well as be able to effect your exit.”). 
104. See  STEFAN, supra note 26, at 351–53 (“The prosecutions of FEN members 
have resulted in making First Amendment law, with defendants successfully challenging 
criminal prohibitions on ‘intentionally advising and encouraging’ suicide as violative of 
their free speech rights.”); Majchrowicz, supra note 82 (“Exit guides, who tend to travel 
in pairs, educate their clients about all aspects of their eventual suicides and sit with them 
as they die. . . . The actual legality of exit guides’ actions varies state to state. . . . Exit guides’ 
primary defense is their First Amendment right to free speech, said the network’s general 
counsel, Robert Rivas, because that’s all exit guides do when they sit with a person about to 
die: They talk.”). 
105. See Sarah Childress, The Suicide Plan: The Evolution of America’s Right-to-
Die Movement, PBS (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-
evolution-of-americas-right-to-die-movement [https://perma.cc/K68R-VTDM] (providing a
timeline and describing arrest and prosecution of FEN members in 2009, 2011, and 2012); 
Rachel Herzog, Fran Schindler Volunteers to Sit by the Deathbed of Those Who Ask, DAILY 
TAR HEEL (Nov. 30, 2015, 12:17 AM), http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/11/fran-
schindler-brings-the-gift-of-deathbed-presence-to-those-who-ask [https://perma.cc/P7KF-
S355] (“The Final Exit Network’s work exists outside the law’s framework.  Assisting a
suicide is illegal in many states, but that’s not what the group does . . . .”); Who Should Be 
Able to Seek Assisted Suicide?, NPR (Mar. 9, 2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ 
transcript.php?storyId=101622533 [https://perma.cc/KU5L-QHNA] (describing FEN’s
activities as part of “these networks, obviously, outside the structure of the laws in those 
two states [Oregon and Washington] that are working to help people if they wish to go this 
way”).  In their Article about VSED as a good option for ending irremediable suffering at 
the end of life, Thaddeus Pope and Lindsey Anderson did not even mention the FEN 
approach despite including illegal euthanasia in the list of options.  Thaddeus Mason Pope 
& Lindsey E. Anderson, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking: A Legal Treatment 
Option at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 363, 375–83 (2011). 
106. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 90. 
107. See Majchrowicz, supra note 82.  Currently forty-four states have laws that make
“assisted suicide” illegal; of those forty-four, forty-two have criminal prohibitions.  For detailed 
statutory citations, see generally supra note 43. 
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of “suicide.”108  The argument is that, if a disease is cutting short an individual’s
life, an individual is only hastening a death that is approaching due to identified, 
specific medical or psychological conditions.109  The contention is that, if
“suicide” means being the causative agent ending the person’s life, the 
individual stricken with a terminal illness is arguably not the causative 
agent and is only hastening a death that is already clearly on the horizon.110 
It would follow that, if a person is not committing suicide, an assisting
person is not assisting suicide and is not, therefore, engaging in a legally 
prohibited act. 
Some aid-in-dying nonprofit organizations vehemently distinguish “hastening 
death” from “suicide” and “aid in dying” from “assisting another to commit
suicide” because it is politically expedient to avoid any importation of the
stigma of suicide.111  However, distinguishing suicide from hastening death 
is not persuasive to those who view as dispositive the action of self-
administration of life-ending medication as causing the actual physical 
death.  Moreover, the argument has not gained any apparent legal traction.112 
For instance, in the California case of Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, Mr. 
Donaldson suffered from an incurable brain tumor that was predicted to 
result in a persistent vegetative state and death within five years of diagnosis.113 
Mr. Donaldson wished to have his body cryogenically preserved before
death, with the expectation of being brought back to life when technology
would be sufficient to restore his body and successfully address the brain 
tumor.114 Mr. Donaldson and his coplaintiff, Dr. Mondragon, sought
a declaratory judgment that premortem freezing of Mr. Donaldson’s body 
would not constitute reason to criminally prosecute Mondragon for homicide 
108. See Margaret Pabst Battin, ‘Death with Dignity’: Is It Suicide?, OUPBLOG (Nov. 7, 
2015), https://blog.oup.com/2015/11/death-with-dignity-suicide [https://perma.cc/4AFY-
7QQL] (“[W]hat about the ALS or the cancer patient? . . . [N]either wanted to die—they had
been making every effort to avoid dying as they went through the medical treatment available.
But now, given that they [are] already dying anyway, what they chose was to avoid the 
more difficult ways of dying that were clearly in their futures.”); Terminology of Assisted
Dying, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/terminology [https://perma.cc/
MRV4-TUSQ] (“Those facing a terminal illness do not want to die but—by definition—
are dying. They are facing an imminent death and want the option to avoid unbearable
suffering.”).
109. See Battin, supra note 108. 
110. Id.
 111. See Cholbi, supra note 27, at 6–7. 
112. See, e.g., Herzog, supra note 105. 
113.  4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 60–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
114. Id. at 61. 
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or assisted suicide.115  Indeed, the argument was that this would preserve
life instead of allowing the brain tumor to end Mr. Donaldson’s life.116 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments to hold that freezing Mr. 
Donaldson’s body prior to his death would result in death and therefore,
that assisting Mr. Donaldson would amount to either homicide or illegal
assistance of another to commit suicide.117  Similarly, in 2010 a Connecticut 
court dismissed a lawsuit in which petitioners sought a declaration that 
“Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-56 does not provide a valid statutory basis to 
prosecute any licensed physician for providing aid in dying because the
choice of a mentally competent terminally ill individual for a peaceful death . . . 
does not constitute ‘suicide’ within the meaning of § 53a-56(a)(2).”118 
FEN does not question that hastening death in the context of a life-
ending illness is suicide.  However, it does challenge the idea that providing 
information about suicide is “assisting” a suicide, even if the information
is provided to a person FEN knows to be contemplating suicide or is in
the act of committing suicide.119  As discussed in Part II, statutory ambiguity 
can result in legal challenges regarding the nature of assistance.  If a state 
explicitly or potentially includes speech acts in its prohibition of assisted 
suicide, the tightrope an organization such as FEN must walk between 
constitutional free speech provisions and criminal law becomes quite taut.  
Indeed, the scope of Georgia’s assisted suicide criminal provision lay at 
the heart of Georgia’s prosecution of FEN, its medical director, and its exit 
guides in 2010.120 
At that time, Georgia’s statute provided that any person “who publicly 
advertises, offers, or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she
will intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of 
suicide and commits any overt act to further that purpose is guilty of a
felony.”121 The Georgia Supreme Court decided that the law violated
constitutional protections of free speech because it “proscribes speech based 
on content” in the form of advertising or holding oneself out as providing 
a service and that the statute was not tailored narrowly enough to promote 
the state’s “compelling interest in preventing suicide”122 because the statute
115. Id. at 60–61.
 116. See id. 
 117.  Id. at 60, 64–65. 
118. Blick v. Office of Div. of Criminal Justice, No. CV095033392, 2010 WL 2817256, 
at *5, *15 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2010).
119. Appellants’ Brief at 1, 8, Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 
2012) (No. S11A1960), 2011 WL 5289141, at * 8. 
120. Final Exit Network, 722 S.E.2d at 723. 
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1994) (amended 2012). 
122. Final Exit Network, 722 S.E.2d at 723–24. 
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prohibited only those assisted suicides in which there was public speech.
The Court stated: 
Had the State [of Georgia] truly been interested in the preservation of human
life . . . it could have imposed a ban on all assisted suicides with no restriction on
protected speech whatsoever.  Alternatively, the State could have sought to prohibit
all offers to assist in suicide when accompanied by an overt act to accomplish
that goal.  The State here did neither.123 
In 2015, the Georgia Legislature amended Official Code of Georgia 
Annotated § 16-5-5 to define “assists” as “the act of physically helping or 
physically providing the means”124 by which an individual commits suicide,
which means “the intentional and willful termination of one’s own life.”125 
Due to FEN’s raising the defense of free speech, Georgia’s law now has
a particularly clear definition of “assisting” suicide compared to other states. 
It serves as an example of an aid-in-dying nonprofit’s influence on developing
laws that allow for individuals to assist some seekers of aid in dying. 
FEN confronted the same type of challenge in 2015 when it was prosecuted
by the state of Minnesota for violating the criminal prohibition on “assisting 
suicide.”126  In the 2014 case of State v. Melchert-Dinkel,127 in which a nurse
allegedly urged individuals to commit suicide so that he could watch, 
Minnesota decided that the state can prohibit assisting suicide that includes 
providing specific information to specific individuals with knowledge that 
the receiver of that information intends to use it specifically to end his or 
her life.128  In 2015, on the basis of the Melchert-Dinkel definition of
assisting suicide included in the jury instructions, the state of Minnesota 
successfully prosecuted FEN for assisting in suicide when its exit guides 
123. Id. at 724. 
124. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(a)(1) (Supp. 2018). 
125. Id. § 16-5-5(a)(3). 
126. State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), 
cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017) (mem.). 
127.  State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014). 
128. Id. at 16; see MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subdiv. 1 (2018).  After rejecting the state’s
arguments that its statute prohibiting speech to cause another to commit suicide falls into 
one or all of the three exceptions—integral to criminal conduct, inciting criminal conduct, and 
fraud—the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld Minnesota’s law under a strict scrutiny 
analysis.  Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 17–18.  The Court found that the state has a 
compelling interest in preserving human life and that the statute is narrowly drawn to protect that 
interest.  Id. at 22.  The Court pointed to the statutory term “another” to conclude that the 
statute was narrowly written to include only situations in which speech is directed to a 
specific person for the specific purpose of encouraging suicide and therefore does not include 
speech reflecting a general viewpoint on committing suicide.  Id. at 16, 18. 
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provided information, knowing that the information would be used by the 
listener to commit suicide.129 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, and both the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied review.130 
In order to protect its ability to help people with documented, prolonged 
suffering who are cognitively and emotionally competent to make the 
decision to end their lives, on April 16, 2018, FEN filed suit against the 
Attorney General of Minnesota seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
to prevent application of the Melchert-Dinkel definition of assisting suicide 
when enforcing the criminal prohibition on assisting suicide.131  On February
22, 2019, the Minnesota District Court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss,132 leaving in place the risk of prosecution if FEN provides information 
to people FEN knows to be contemplating ending their lives, regardless 
of reasons. 
In the Georgia and Minnesota prosecutions, as well as the subsequent
Minnesota litigation, FEN focused heavily on the definition of free speech, 
which includes educating individuals about their options and providing 
companionship at the time of death for qualified individuals seeking to 
end their lives as a response to irremediable end-of-life suffering.133  FEN
consistently denies that it engages in physical acts to further a suicide, and 
its exit guides are trained to avoid violations of physical act prohibitions 
while attending a death.134 The role this organization plays is to secure legal 
clarity about what constitutes assistance, as it did in Georgia, so that individuals 
wanting to end their lives to end prolonged end-of-life suffering can receive 
information and, if desired, companionship at the time of death.135  FEN
might have a long litigation path ahead considering legal hostility to assisting 
129. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d at 301–02. 
130. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. Minnesota, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017) (mem.); Final Exit 
Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d at 301–02 (“After deciding Melchert-Dinkel, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court denied further review of State v. Final Exit Network, Inc.”); State v. Final 
Exit Network, Inc., No. A13-0563, 2013 WL 5418170 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2013), appeal
after remand, 889 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017). 
131. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Final Exit Network, Inc. 
v. Ellison, 370 F. Supp. 3d 995 (D. Minn. 2019) (No. 18-CV-01025), 2018 WL 1858565; 
see also Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Final Exit Network, 370 F. Supp. 3d 995 
(No. 0:18-cv-01-25-JNE/SER), 2018 WL 7047316. 
132. Final Exit Network, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1020.  The Minnesota district court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that FEN’s facial challenge claims were barred 
by collateral estoppel. Id. at 1019–20. 
133. Id. at 1007, 1010; Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722, 724 (Ga. 
2012).
134. Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 63 (“We do not provide the 
means for self-deliverance and we do not assist in self-deliverance.”). 
135. Id. (containing language from FEN’s website sections pertaining to mission and
exit guide services). 
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another to die and the apparent room in many state statutes for interpretations
that could include speech acts as prohibited assistance or participation.136 
If FEN did not attend deaths, it might be easier to persuade factfinders that
there was clear separation between providing information and participation. 
However, companionship is a compassionate response to someone taking
such a momentous step, and providing information at the time of death
can be critical to a successful outcome for the seeker.
B. State Medical Aid-in-Dying Statutes 
Several aid-in-dying organizations work for the passage of MAiD statutes. 
MAiD statutes carve out an exception to criminal and civil prohibitions 
against assisted suicide to enable physicians to lawfully prescribe lethal
doses of medication and for pharmacists to lawfully fill those prescriptions, 
knowing that the patient is going to die if the dose is ingested.137  It is  
difficult to overstate how radical this is under current medical practice and 
law. Medical practice is oriented toward saving lives,138 and the law prohibits
136. For examples of the state statutes that lack clarity to varying degrees about whether
speech acts alone could lead to prosecution, see ALA. CODE § 22-8B-4 (2019) (effective 
Aug. 1, 2017); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (2019) (effective June 3, 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 5-10-104, -106 (2019) (effective July 31, 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (Deering 
2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56 (2019) (effective Oct. 1, 1971); 
FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (2019) (effective June 26, 2019); 
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 204 (2019) (effective Sept. 19, 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 750.329a (2019) (effective Sept. 1, 1998) (common law assisted suicide); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 752.1027 (effective Feb. 25, 1993) (criminal assistance to suicide); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.215 (1998) (effective Aug. 1, 1999) (the words severed “advising or encouraging” 
suicide were held unconstitutional by State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 
2014)); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2019) (effective 
Jan. 1, 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (2019); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (2018) (effective Nov. 1, 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-
6 (West 2019) (effective Aug. 1, 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (LexisNexis 2019); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 2019) (effective Sept. 1, 1967) (promoting a suicide 
attempt); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2019) (effective Sept. 1, 1967) (second-degree 
manslaughter); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (2017) 
(second degree manslaughter); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.193 (2019) (assisting suicide and 
exemptions); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (West 2019) (effective June 6, 1973); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37 (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West 2019) (effective 
Sept. 1, 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (LexisNexis 2019) (effective May 5, 2018); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-622.1 (2019) (effective July 1, 2015); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 
(2019) (effective July 22, 2011); WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (2019). 
137. See ZITTER, supra note 16, at 307. 
138. Id. at 16. 
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assisting someone to commit suicide. Nonprofit organizations focused on
legal passage of aid-in-dying statutes emphasize that self-administration 
of life-ending medication is not suicide if undertaken in compliance with 
the statute, by legal definition of the statute.139 
Advocacy for MAiD statutes at the state level began with the failure of 
three terminally ill patients and an aid-in-dying nonprofit, Compassion in
Dying, to convince the U.S. Supreme Court that access to aid in dying should 
be protected as a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.140  In its 1997 Washington v. Glucksberg
decision, the Supreme Court echoed some of the concerns of the California 
appellate court in its 1992 decision of Donaldson v. Van de Kamp: the state 
may be legitimately concerned about the potential for abuse of a vulnerable 
person for self-interest when one helps another to die, about “the sanctity 
of life [being] threatened by one who is willing to participate in taking the 
life of another, even at the victim’s request,” and about the unfairness of 
finding culpable a person whose suicide was a manifestation of psychiatric 
illness, while, on the other hand, finding it fair to deem a presumably mentally 
competent person culpable for assisting another to commit suicide.141  The
Supreme Court included additional justifications for its decision, such as 
preventing a possibly negative impact on the integrity of the medical 
profession and a slippery slope toward active euthanasia.142 
The key to state level advocacy is that, while the Court found no federal 
constitutional right to medical aid-in-dying, it did not foreclose states from 
enacting MAiD statutes.  The Court stated, “[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans 
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, 
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide.  Our holding permits this 
debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”143 
That debate has indeed continued. The result is a tumultuous period of 
various states considering MAiD and anti-MAiD statutes.  In the twenty 
years since MAiD advocacy began, only nine jurisdictions have adopted 
these statutes144 because opposition is strong, also.  The following states 
139. See generally Cholbi, supra note 27. 
140.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–08 (1997). 
141. Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); see also
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729–32. 
142. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 703–04. 
143. Id. at 735. 
144. See Michael Ollove, Aid-in-Dying Gains Momentum as Erstwhile Opponents
Change Their Minds, PEW TRUSTS (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/09/aid-in-dying-gains-momentum-as-erstwhile-
opponents-change-their-minds [https://perma.cc/PN8B-Z95K] (“Support for aid-in-dying 
is increasing—a recent Gallup poll found two-thirds in favor, up from half four years earlier.  
Major medical groups have dropped or softened their opposition.”).  The nine jurisdictions 
are California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawai’i, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, 
178
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considered but did not enact MAiD statutes: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.145 
Sometimes MAiD statutes are proposed repeatedly; California, New Jersey, 
and Maine are but three examples of states that previously considered and 
rejected MAiD statutes before eventually enacting them.146 
Opposition to MAiD laws has taken the form of explicit criminal bans 
on medical aid in dying.147  This is striking because the law in the vast
and Washington, with the most recent being Maine, which signed into law June 12, 2019, 
and will take effect ninety days after adjournment of the legislature, and New Jersey, effective
August 1, 2019. However, both the Maine and New Jersey laws are currently under attack.
See Maine, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/maine/ [https://
perma.cc/4LJT-2YWE]; New Jersey, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.
org/states/new-jersey/ [https://perma.cc/4TMX-JKUE].  For the statutes in the nine jurisdictions, 
see End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.–.22 (West 2019); End-
of-Life Options Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-48-101 to -123 (2018); Death with Dignity
Act, D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01 to -.16 (2017); Our Care, Our Choice Act, HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 327L-1 to -25 (LexisNexis 2019); Death with Dignity Act, ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2140 (2019); 
Medical Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:16-1 to -20 (West 
2019); Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2018); Patient 
Choice at End of Life, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–93 (2019); Washington Death with 
Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010–.904 (2019). 
145. KATE MCEVOY, 20 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: CONNECTICUT ELDER LAW
§ 3:25 (2018). 
146. California considered passage of MAiD law by ballot proposition in 1992, but 
it failed.  Death with Dignity in California: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.
deathwithdignity.org/death-with-dignity-california-history [https://perma.cc/TB3P-W5ZQ].
In 1997, a “death with dignity” bill made it out of California Assembly committees but 
was not brought for a vote by the full Assembly.  Id. In 2005, another bill, the California 
Compassionate Choices Act, failed. Id.  The California End of Life Options Act was passed
by the California Legislature and signed into law by then-Governor Jerry Brown on October 5,
2015. Id. In New Jersey, MAiD bills were introduced to the New Jersey legislature in the
2012–2013, 2014–2015, and 2016–2017 sessions, but all failed. New Jersey, supra note 
144.  The Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act was introduced on January 9, 2018, in
the New Jersey Assembly, and its companion bill was introduced in the New Jersey Senate 
on January 22, 2018.  Id.  A consolidated form of the bills passed in both houses on March 
25, 2019, and was signed into law on April 12, 2019, by Governor Phil Murphy.  Id.  In 
Maine, Death with Dignity National Center reports that in the 2019–2020 session, in which 
the law was enacted, was the third time the legislature had considered a MAiD law.  Maine 
Death with Dignity Act Goes Into Effect, DEATH WITH DIGNITY (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www. 
deathwithdignity.org/news/2019/09/maine-death-with-dignity-act-in-effect/ [https://perma.cc/
7WAJ-9238].
147. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8B-4 (2019) (part of the 2017 “Assisted Suicide Ban
Act,” criminalizing both assistance by individuals and by physicians or health care providers; 
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majority of states already prohibits assisting another to commit suicide, 
which would seem to cover physicians assisting patients to end their lives.
Nevertheless, five jurisdictions have strengthened their prohibitions on
assisting suicide by enacting explicit anti-MAiD statutes; three of these
jurisdictions have done so since 2017.148  For instance, in 2018, Utah
criminalized “intentionally, and with knowledge that another individual 
intends to commit suicide or attempt to commit suicide, aid[ing] the other 
individual to commit suicide”149 and excludes “practitioners”—professional 
medical care providers—only if the practitioner “provides medication or 
a procedure to treat an individual’s illness or relieve an individual’s pain 
or discomfort . . . unless the practitioner intentionally and knowingly provides 
the medication or procedure to aid the individual to commit suicide or 
attempt to commit suicide.”150 
As in the case of MAiD statutes, states may consider anti-MAiD statutes
repeatedly. For instance, Montana’s legislature considered a MAiD ban 
in 2011 and again in 2019.151  Accordingly, aid-in-dying nonprofits must
be as actively engaged in defeating anti-MAiD proposals as in advocating 
for enacting MAiD statutes.  Compassion & Choices strongly opposed 
Montana’s 2019 anti-MAiD proposal and continues to monitor the legal 
situation there.152 
Opposition to medical aid in dying is reflected not only in external 
threats, such as anti-MAiD proposals and federal and state proposals that 
weaken MAiD laws, it is reflected also in the MAiD statutes themselves.
All MAiD statutes include multiple requirements that significantly limit
patient utilization of the laws.153  They all contain similar qualification and 
procedural requirements because the first such law, which was enacted in 
for physicians and health care providers, specifically bans “prescrib[ing] any drug compound,
or substance to a patient deliberately to aid in dying or assist[ing] or perform[ing] any medical
procedure deliberately to aid in dying”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.04 (Westlaw 2019)
(making “assisting suicide” a felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (LexisNexis 2019) 
(providing the manslaughter statute amended to criminalize assisted suicide). 
148. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205(2)(b). 
149. Id.
 150. Id. §76-5-205(5) (emphasis added). 
151. H.B. 284, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019); Jacob Fuhrer, Bill Aims to Ban 
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Montana, KPAX (Jan. 29, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://kpax.com/ 
news/montana-legislature/2019/01/29/bill-aims-to-ban-physician-assisted-suicide-in-
montana [https://perma.cc/6ELP-XX4J].  The proposed law provides that a patient’s consent to
receive a lethal dose prescription does not protect a physician from liability for providing 
that prescription.  Fuhrer, supra.  An attempt to pass a physician-assisted suicide ban in 2017 
failed. Id. 
 152. Montana, COMPASSION & CHOICES, https://compassionandchoices.org/in-your-
state/montana [https://perma.cc/TKQ2-BAAX].
153. See Death with Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity. 
org/learn/death-with-dignity-acts/ [https://perma.cc/YUG6-99FG]. 
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Oregon in 1994, has served as the basis for subsequently enacted laws.154 
All require the following: the seeker must be within six months of death,155 
cognitively competent to understand the import of taking life-ending 
mediation,156 submit to additional medical examinations if a physician 
believes that transient emotional states might be driving the decision,157 
154. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800–.897 (2018); STEFAN, supra note 26, at 130
(“Oregon’s law is the oldest in the country.  It was passed in 1994 but was not implemented 
until 1997. Most state initiatives since then have been patterned on Oregon’s law as 
a model.”); Pamela S. Kaufmann, Aid-in-Dying Laws Present New Challenges for Health 
Care Providers, A.B.A HEALTH ESOURCE (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/health_law/publications/aba_health_esource/2016-2017/august2017/aidindying 
[https://perma.cc/YNT9-P2MC] (“The state AID statutes are modeled after the Oregon statute, 
the first state AID law.”).
155. See Browne C. Lewis, A Graceful Exit: Redefining Terminal to Expand the 
Availability of Physician-Facilitated Suicide, 91 OR. L. REV. 457, 484 (2012) (“The current 
system in place fails to serve the needs of two categories of patients. Some patients . . . 
who suffer from diseases that destroy the physical body, are not considered terminal because 
their doctors predict that they will survive longer than six months. . . . Another group of 
patients . . . suffer from progressive, irreversible brain disorders that gradually destroy 
their memories and their abilities to learn, reason, and make decisions.  Those patients can 
physically survive their conditions for an indeterminate period of time.”); see also Cyndi
Bollman, A Dignified Death? Don’t Forget About the Physically Disabled and Those Not
Terminally Ill: An Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide Laws, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 395, 396
(2010) (“The current physician-assisted suicide statutes in Oregon and Washington do not 
permit a physically disabled person to be assisted by her doctors in committing suicide 
because she is unable to ingest the medications on her own.  Further, the laws are limited 
to only those patients who are terminally ill, despite the fact that many patients suffer from 
long-lasting painful diseases which progressively become more unbearable, disqualifying 
them from being permitted to die with the assistance of their physician.”). 
156. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 90. 
157. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a)(1)(A)(ii) (West 2019) (“If there 
are indications of a mental disorder, the physician shall refer the individual for a mental 
health specialist assessment”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-108 (2019) (requiring referral to 
a licensed mental health professional if the attending or consulting physician believes that 
the individual may not be “mentally capable and making an informed decision”); D.C. CODE 
§ 7-661.04 (2019) (“If, in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting 
physician, a patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer patient to counseling.”); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 327L-6 (2019) (“The attending provider shall refer the patient for counseling.”); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.825 (“If in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting 
physician a patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression 
causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer the patient for counseling.”); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283(8) (2019) (physician provided with immunity as long as they 
document specific required actions, including: “The physician either verified that the patient 
did not have impaired judgment or referred the patient for an evaluation by a psychiatrist, 
psychologist, or clinical social worker . . . for confirmation that the patient was capable and 
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make repeated requests,158 endure waiting periods between requests, and 
be able to self-administer the life-ending medication.159 
These requirements create true hardship and disparate treatment among 
patients with indistinguishable degrees and types of end-of-life suffering.
For instance, unlike a seeker whose illness does not destroy the seeker’s 
cognitive capacity prior to a prognosis of death within six months, some
seekers have illnesses, such as Alzheimer’s, that rob them of cognitive capacity
prior to that prognosis.160  Simply because they have a different underlying 
illness—not because their suffering is less, those seekers have less access 
to medical aid in dying.  Aid-in-dying nonprofits know that this is unfair, 
and some imagine that a successful constitutional Equal Protection challenge 
could be brought.161  However, advocates may be loath to challenge it if 
the six-month prognosis is understood as protective of both seeker and 
physician and also as necessary for passage of the law.  It ensures that seekers 
are truly dying before physicians assist them in ending their lives.  It protects 
physicians in that such a prognosis qualifies a person for hospice,162 which 
becomes an independent measure of qualification, besides the seeker’s 
physician’s certification, that a patient is suffering irremediably from 
a terminal condition. 
The requirement of ability to self-administer medication also creates
disparities among seekers. Seekers diagnosed with Parkinson’s or ALS
might not be able to self-administer life-ending medication when they
eventually enter the last six months of their lives due to decreasing ability 
to swallow or to bring food, water, or medications to their mouths unassisted
did not have impaired judgment.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.060 (2019) (language 
virtually identical to Oregon’s statute). 
158. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3 (West 2019) (requiring two oral requests, 
at least fifteen days apart, plus a written request); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-104 (2019) 
(same); D.C. CODE § 7-661.02 (2019) (requiring two oral requests, at least fifteen days apart, 
plus written request before second oral request, at least forty-eight hours before medication 
is prescribed or dispensed); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-9 (2019) (requiring two oral requests 
at least twenty days apart, plus a written request); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840 (2018) (requiring 
two oral requests at least fifteen days apart, plus written request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
§ 5283 (2019) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.245.090 (2019) (same). 
159. See Bollman, supra note 155, at 396. 
160. Norman L. Cantor, My Plan to Avoid the Ravages of Extreme Dementia, BILL 
HEALTH (Apr. 16, 2015), http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/16/my-plan-to-
avoid-the-ravages-of-extreme-dementia [https://perma.cc/HTW7-V8V4]; Cognitive Function, 
Dementia, and Alzheimer’s Disease, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://nccih.nih.gov/health/alzheimer [https://perma.cc/M9ZS-N2M9]. 
161.  Telephone Interview with Robb Miller, former Exec. Dir. & Bd. Member, End 
of Life Wash. (Jan. 25, 2019). 
162. See, e.g., Hospice Care, U.S. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/hospice-care [https://perma.cc/3J24-QZS8] (requiring
a terminally ill diagnosis with life expectancy less than six months and patient electing for
palliative care).
182
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by another.163 Such individuals would not be able to use aid-in-dying
statutory law no matter how cognitively competent they might be, unless 
they can self-administer the life-ending medication.164  Aid-in-dying nonprofits 
conceded to this requirement because self-administration is key to separating 
the physician and other medical care providers from the patient’s death, 
avoiding claims that a patient was assisted or that someone provided 
“euthanasia.”165 Those nonprofits know that an Americans with Disabilities
Act challenge could be brought to require accommodation for those who 
cannot orally self-administer life-ending medication.166 Yet, the belief is
strong that this requirement enabled enactment of existing laws and facilitates 
passage of new laws.167  The self-administration requirement enables healthcare
providers, family members, and friends to avoid any direct involvement 
in an individual’s death. 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits participated in the development of MAiD statutes
that include a number of other requirements designed ostensibly to ensure 
a seeker’s autonomous, stable decision and to reduce the possibility of
undue influence from others.  Cast as protections for people who may be 
inadequately informed or who could be unduly influenced or coerced, 
requirements, such as waiting periods, repeated requests, and limitations 
on who can serve as a witness to such requests, create barriers to utilization 
of the law quickly enough to ease the suffering of seekers slow to realize 
that their suffering cannot be alleviated and will not end before death. 
Nevertheless, aid-in-dying nonprofits agreed to all of these requirements, 
believing them to be necessary for passage of the very first MAiD statute
and all MAiD statutes thereafter.168 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits using a MAiD approach are surely also aware 
that laws they sponsor and defend exacerbate physician reluctance to
163. Lewis, supra note 155, at 485; Symptoms and Diagnosis, ALS ASS’N, http://www. 
alsa.org/about-als/symptoms.html [https://perma.cc/J7PV-FHTJ]; see also Speech & Swallowing 
Problems, PARKINSON’S FOUND., https://www.parkinson.org/Understanding-Parkinsons/
Symptoms/Non-Movement-Symptoms/Speech-and-Swallowing-Problems [https://perma.cc/
LM9K-94BK]; Tremor, PARKINSON’S FOUND., https://www.parkinson.org/Understanding-
Parkinsons/Symptoms/Movement-Symptoms/Tremor [https://perma.cc/WZ4M-FGL4].
164. See Bollman, supra note 155, at 396; Lewis, supra note 155, at 485. 
165. Amanda M. Thyden, Death with Dignity and Assistance: A Critique of the Self-
Administration Requirement in California’s End of Life Option Act, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 421, 
422 (2017).
166.  Telephone Interview with Robb Miller, supra note 161. 
167. Id.
 168. Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 90. 
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assist a seeker.  There are extralegal factors, such as physicians’ discomfort 
with helping patients to die, in apparent conflict with the requirement of
helping patients to get better,169 and legal factors, such as physicians’ 
difficulties in gaining knowledge of the extensive rules these statutes contain, 
which can lead to liability exposure if not followed.  Physicians have also 
expressed lack of confidence in their ability to adequately assess patient 
mental health in accordance with statutory requirements, uncertainty about 
the efficacy of medications they would prescribe, and impatience with 
extensive paperwork requirements.170  MAiD statutes also have employer 
opt-out provisions, which enable an employer to prevent an otherwise 
willing physician from writing a lethal dose prescription.171 
169. See STEFAN, supra note 26, at 222 (“Many doctors are uncomfortable with an
official, state-sanctioned program that formally links doctors with providing the means of 
ending life to their patients, even while they concede that there may be a place for unofficial 
mercy.”); Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and Experiences with End-
Of-Life Care Since Passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 285 JAMA 2363, 2366
(2001) (“Thirty percent of all physician respondents agreed with a statement that writing
a lethal prescription for a patient under the Death with Dignity Act was immoral and/or
unethical, 59% disagreed, and 11% neither disagreed nor agreed.”); Lawrence O. Gostin
& Anna E. Roberts, Physician-Assisted Dying: A Turning Point?, 315 JAMA 249, 249 
(2016) (“Whether PAD [physician-assisted dying] is incompatible with the physician’s 
oath to ‘do no harm’ is hotly contested.”); JoNel Aleccia, Legalizing Aid in Dying Doesn’t Mean 
Patients Have Access to It, NPR (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
health-shots/2017/01/25/511456109/legalizing-aid-in-dying-doesnt-mean-patients-have-
access-to-it [https://perma.cc/EH2C-PYWD] (“Many doctors in California remain reluctant to
participate because of misunderstandings about what the law requires, says Dr. Jay W. 
Lee, past president of the California Academy of Family Physicians.  ‘I believe that there 
is still a strong taboo against talking about death openly in the medical community.  It feels 
like a threat to what we are trained to do: preserve and extend life,’ Lee says . . . .”).
For statements by individual doctors, see, for example, ATUL AWANDE  EING ORTAL  
MEDICINE AND WHAT MATTERS IN THE END 244–45 (2014) (“I fear what happens when we 
expand the terrain of medical practice to include actively assisting people with speeding 
their death.  I am less worried about abuse of these powers than I am about dependence on 
them.”); Ira Byock, Opinion, Think Twice About ‘Death with Dignity,’ L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2015, at A19 (“I believe that deliberately ending the lives of ill people represents a socially 
erosive response to basic human needs.”). 
G , B M :
170. See, e.g., Arthi Kumaravel, Physician Aid-in-Dying: Practical Considerations, 
13 AM J. PSYCHIATRY, Aug. 2018, at 3, 4 (“As the practice of physician aid-in-dying is 
legalized further in the United States and gains momentum globally, multiple practical 
concerns arise, particularly regarding implementation among patients with impaired 
cognition or psychiatric disorders and clarification of the role of psychiatrists.”); David R. 
Grube, Ten Facts About Medical Aid in Dying, MD MAG. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www. 
mdmag.com/medical-news/ten-facts-about-medical-aid-in-dying [https://perma.cc/4P5X-
3HER] (“Many dying patients in Oregon are unable to utilize the Death with Dignity Act 
because they die before the entire process can be completed and doctors can be reluctant
to practice because of the paperwork.”). 
171. See, e.g., End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.15 (West 
2019) (“[A] health care provider may prohibit its employees, independent contractors, or 
other persons or entities, including other health care providers, from participating in activities 
184
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Due to restrictions on patient access and hindrances to physician 
participation, aid-in-dying options have less utility and are, in fact, not 
used very often.172  Perhaps one could claim that existing MAiD laws are
just starting points and that, once accepted, they will serve as the platform 
for more compassionate laws that cover more situations and people, with 
fewer impediments to physician participation.  Yet, there is no evidence 
of that; so far, the laws are far from evolving to secure greater access to 
medical aid in dying. 
under this part while on premises owned or under the management or direct control of that 
prohibiting health care provider or while acting within the course and scope of any employment 
by, or contract with, the prohibiting health care provider.”).  For an example of how this 
plays out in practice, see, for example, Aleccia, supra note 169 (discussing situation of Annette 
Schiller, who was seeking assistance under California’s medical aid-in-dying law: “In 
California’s Coachella Valley, where Annette Schiller lived, the three largest hospitals . . . 
all opted out of the new state law.  Affiliated doctors can’t use hospital premises, resources 
or systems in connection with aid in dying, hospital officials said. . . . In practice, however, 
that decision has had a chilling effect, says Dr. Howard Cohen, a Palm Springs hospice
doctor whose firm also prohibits him from writing aid-in-dying prescriptions or serving as
an attending physician.”); Lindsey Holden, When SLO Woman Could No Longer Fight for 
Her Life, She Chose to Fight for Her Death, TRIBUNE, https://www.sanluisobispo.com/
news/health-and-medicine/article218638260.html [https://perma.cc/AD8N-DGFF] (last
updated Oct. 5, 2018, 7:47 AM) (Part 1); Lindsey Holden, Assisted Death Came Peacefully 
for SLO Woman. But She Faced a Painful Fight to Fulfill Her Wish, TRIBUNE, https://
www.sanluisobispo.com/news/health-and-medicine/article218699615.html [https://perma.cc/ 
VH69-DUNM] (last updated Oct. 4, 2018, 1:33 PM) (Part 2, describing the story of San 
Luis Obispo, California, resident and terminal cancer patient Christine Whaley, who could
not find a doctor in San Luis Obispo to prescribe end-of-life medication, and ended up
seeking assistance from UCLA where she had been receiving some treatment.); Tara Law,
Colorado Doctor Fired After Suing to Provide Patient with Aid-in-Dying Medication, TIME 
(Sept. 3, 2019), https://time.com/5666225/colorado-doctor-fired-aid-in-dying-medication
[https://perma.cc/7VQ9-3MVV] (discussing the response of Centura Health, a Catholic and
Adventist faith-based medical care network, to an employee physician’s suit to allow her 
to prescribe lethal dose prescriptions in accordance with Colorado’s Access to Medical 
Aid in Dying Law, despite the network’s using the “opt-out” provision in the law). 
172. See Paula Span, Physician Aid in Dying Gains Acceptance in the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/health/physician-aid-in-dying.html 
[https://perma.cc/F7UL-FMPF] (“Aid in dying . . . may be a vehemently debated issue . . . 
but it ultimately has affected a tiny proportion of people. . . . [A]fter nearly 20 years in Oregon 
and eight in Washington, far fewer than 1 percent of annual deaths involve a lethal prescription.”); 
see also Fenit Nirappil, A Year After D.C. Passed Its Controversial Assisted Suicide Law, 
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In fact, as each new state considers adoption of a MAiD statute, more
requirements are included than in previously enacted state laws.  For
instance, California’s law requires more certification of qualification and 
more paperwork than previously enacted statutes in other states.173 Aid-
in-dying advocates were not completely disappointed when Maryland’s
2019 proposed MAiD bill was not enacted because bill amendments
“imposed so many roadblocks that few, if any, physicians or patients would 
likely opt to take advantage of the bill even if it became law.”174  Indeed, 
this is one reason organizations such as Compassion & Choices and End 
of Life Liberty Project would develop the alternative approach of pursuing 
litigation, including declaratory judgments with the core claim that physicians 
providing lethal dose prescriptions are not assisting a suicide and are, 
instead, practicing medicine with appropriate and lawful regard for the 
needs and choices of their patients. 
C. Judicial Opinions as a Basis for Protecting Patients’ Rights of
Access to Aid in Dying 
Compassion & Choices and End of Life Liberty Project support use of 
a third basic legal approach to aiding qualified people who choose to end 
their lives: judicial opinions that protect patients’ rights to aid in dying as 
a matter of patients’ reasonable expectations of medical treatment options 
provided by their physicians.175  In 2014, it seemed that this approach
could gain traction when a New Mexico district court judge held that New 
Mexico residents have a constitutional right to receive physician assistance 
173. See End of Life Option Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2019); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.8 (West 2019) (providing the items to be in individual’s 
medical record, including all oral and written requests; attending and consulting physicians’ 
diagnoses, prognoses, and specific determinations; report of mental health specialist’s 
assessment, if performed; attending physician’s offer to withdraw or rescind request 
at time of second oral request; attending physician’s note documents fulfillment of extensive 
requirements under other sections, plus notation of the aid-in-dying drug prescribed); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.9 (West 2019) (requiring submission of qualifying patient’s 
document to State Department of Public Health and submission of multiple documents by 
the attending physician at specified times); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.22 (West 
2019) (attending physician checklist and compliance form, consulting physician compliance 
form, and attending physician follow-up form; updating of forms, including sample form 
that may be updated by the Medical Board of California). 
174. Ovetta Wiggins, No Aid-in-Dying in Maryland this Year: Bill Fails With Tie Vote in
Senate, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/
2019/03/27/2d128d82-4ffd-11e9-88a1-ed346f0ec94f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.b760528bca1e [https://perma.cc/U5ZJ-GDX8].
175.  Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid-in-Dying Is Health Care, JURIST (June 10, 2018, 11:41
AM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/06/kathryn-tucker-aid-dying [https://perma.cc/
3XH2-6EW9]; Morris v. Bradenburg, COMPASSION & CHOICES, https://compassionand 
choices.org/legal-advocacy/past-cases/morris-v-bradenburg [https://perma.cc/3MK4-Q3T5]. 
186
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in dying.176  However, the New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately held in 
2016 that there is no such constitutional right.177 
Justice Edward Chavez, writing the New Mexico Supreme Court’s unanimous
decision, acknowledged that “the State does not have a legitimate interest 
in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will imminently come to
an end.”178  Nevertheless, Justice Chavez focused on the concern that 
“end-of-life decisions are inherently fraught with the potential for abuse” 
and that “[r]egulation in this area is essential, given that if a patient carries 
out his or her end-of-life decision it cannot be reversed, even if turns out 
that the patient did not make the decision of his or her own free will.”179 
Concern about vulnerable individuals has been a focus in other judicial 
opinions, as well.  Among its reasons for rejecting the argument that Washington
state’s ban on physician-assisted suicide violates patients’ constitutionally 
protected liberty rights, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Washington
v. Glucksberg that protecting vulnerable individuals and groups could
legitimately lie at the heart of a state’s rejection of physician-assisted 
suicide.180  How can an individual’s autonomy at end of life be protected
while, at the same time, protecting individuals from undue influence from 
others or from making impulsive or poorly informed decisions?  This question 
can be understood as an enormously challenging, legitimate question about 
the tension between vulnerability and autonomy.  On the other hand, this 
question can be understood as a regressive tactic to preserve the status
quo. How often is progress delayed because of arguments that the change 
would not be good for the intended beneficiary of change?181  At the very 
176. Morris v. Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV-2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672977, at *1 
(Dist. Ct. N.M. Jan. 31, 2014), rev’d, 356 P.3d (N.M. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 376 P.3d 836 
(N.M. 2016).
177.  Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836, 857 (N.M. 2016). 
178. Id. at 838. 
179.  Id. at 849, 857. 
180.  521 U.S. 702, 731, 735 (1997). 
181. Regarding the historical argument that slavery is beneficial to enslaved people, 
see Clyde Wilson, John C. Calhoun and Slavery as a “Positive Good:” What He Said, 
ABBEVILLE INST. (June 26, 2014), https://www.abbevilleinstitute.org/clyde-wilson-library/ 
john-c-calhoun-and-slavery-as-a-positive-good-what-he-said [https://perma.cc/YA42-7933]
(“Never before in history, he continued, has the black race ‘attained a condition so civilised 
and so improved, not only physically but morally and intellectually in the course of a few 
generations it has grown up under the fostering care of our institutions, as reviled as they 
have been, to its present comparative civilised condition.’  The rapid increase of numbers, 
nearly equal to the white population, Calhoun, said ‘is conclusive proof’ of the advancement 
and of the relative comfort of this class of Southern labourers.”).  Regarding the historical 
 187









   
    
 




   
    
 
 




     
 
 
    
 
   
least however, this area of law highlights how little we know about 
“vulnerability,” “autonomy,” and “autonomous” decisions.182 
Right now, only Montana has a common law decision that allows medical 
aid in dying,183 which was established by its supreme court decision in 
Baxter v. State.184  Plaintiffs included Robert Baxter, a terminally ill 
individual, physicians who would provide lethal dose prescriptions to such
patients if legally permitted, and the nonprofit Compassion & Choices.185 
When the matter reached the Montana Supreme Court, it was narrowed to
“whether the consent of the patient to his physician’s aid in dying could
constitute a statutory defense to a homicide charge” brought against the 
physician who wrote the lethal dose prescription.186 The defense of patient
consent would not be upheld if it were “against public policy to permit the 
conduct or the resulting harm, even though consented to.”187  The Montana 
Supreme Court decided that it was not against public policy to allow the 
physician to use the defense of patient consent in the event of prosecution 
for murder of the patient.188 Grounding its decision in the Terminally Ill
Act, the court concluded that patients are acting autonomously when they 
decide to self-administer drugs that cause their own deaths; the physician 
is not killing them.189 
As noted by a Montana Supreme Court judge who concurred in the decision, 
the majority’s decision “is not necessarily limited to physicians,” since 
patient consent could also cover possible prosecution of pharmacists who
fill the prescription.190  But what is a qualifying “terminal illness?” It was 
argument that same-sex marriage would be harmful to gay identity, see Paula L. Ettelbrick,
Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK NAT’L LESBIAN & GAY Q., Fall 
1989, at 9, 14–17; see also THE MARRYING KIND?: DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE WITHIN 
THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENT (Mary Bernstein & Verta Taylor eds., 2013). For laws 
characterized as beneficial to women but arguably not, see, for example, Mark Joseph Stern,
Laws to Protect Women Often Do Just the Opposite, SLATE (Feb. 9, 2016, 9:51 AM), https:// 
slate.com/human-interest/2016/02/laws-to-protect-women-often-do-just-the-opposite.html
[https://perma.cc/GJ5Y-Y593].
182. See generally Margaret P. Battin, Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope:
The Challenge of Empirical Evidence, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 91, 127–28 (2008); Katie 
Franklin, Physician Assisted Death, Dementia, and Euthanasia: Using an Advanced Directive 
to Facilitate the Desires of Those with Impending Memory Loss, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 547, 
567–68 (2015); Megan S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for Relational Nudges 
in End-of-Life Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062 (2018). 
183. Alyssa Thurston, Physician-Assisted Death: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 
111 L. LIBR. J. 31, 39 (2019). 
184.  Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009). 
185.  Id. at 1211, 1214. 
186. Id. at 1215. 
187. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-211(2)(d) (2019); see Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215. 
188.  Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215. 
189. Id. at 1217–22. 
190. See id. at 1223 (Warner, J., concurring). 
188
BRYANT_57-1_BRYANT FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2020 7:27 PM    
  





   
 








   
  
 






[VOL. 57:  147, 2020] Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
clear in Robert Baxter’s case; he died the day the trial court issued its
opinion.191  But what if a patient’s illness is still considered “treatable,” 
although not likely to be fully successful?  What if the patient is suffering 
primarily from what some, but not all, physicians would consider a treatable 
psychiatric illness? Would the supreme court’s decision cover family or 
friends who attend the death?  Would they be vulnerable to prosecution 
for assisting suicide? If so, under what circumstances? 
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Baxter is not a MAiD statutory 
equivalent; there is no detailed “safe harbor” of rules a physician can follow
to avoid prosecution and no statutory immunity for physicians and pharmacists 
who choose to assist a patient.192  A risk-averse physician could be concerned
about the possibility that an after-the-fact assessment of what the physician 
actually did in a particular case involving a particular patient could result 
in a successful prosecution for homicide, if the prosecutor argues persuasively 
that the physician’s acts were not contemplated or covered by the court’s 
decision in Baxter. 
There is limited evidence that physicians provide lethal dose prescriptions
to patients in Montana,193  but there is no evidence that the Baxter decision 
has served as a template for such judicial decisions elsewhere.  Yet, in 
191. Kirk Johnson, Montana Court to Rule on Assisted Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/us/01montana.html?mtrref=www.
google.com&assetType=REGIWALL [https://perma.cc/R66R-ZZWD].
192. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215. 
[I]f the State prosecutes a physician for providing aid in dying to a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult patient who consented to such aid, the physician
may be shielded from liability pursuant to the consent statute.  This consent defense,
however, is only effective if none of the statutory exceptions to consent applies.
Id. (emphasis added).  The Montana Supreme Court then proceeded to analyze the four
statutory exceptions: (1) incompetence; (2) youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication; (3)
force, duress, or deception; and (4) against public policy. Id.  While the court found that consent
to physician aid in dying was not against public policy, with respect to the first three
exceptions, the court noted that “[t]he first three statutory circumstances rendering consent 
ineffective require case-by-case factual determinations.” Id.
 193. See Jean T. Abbott, Jacqueline J. Glover & Matthew K. Wynia, Accepting 
Professional Accountability: A Call for Uniform National Data Collection on Medical
Aid-in-Dying, HEALTH AFF. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20171109.33370/full [https://perma.cc/C6Y3-8QM8]; JoNel Aleccia, At Some Veterans 
Homes, Aid-in-Dying Is Not An Option, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 13, 2018), https:// 
khn.org/news/california-joins-states-that-would-evict-veterans-who-seek-aid-in-dying-option
[https://perma.cc/2DDU-UQAY] (“Dr. Eric Kress, a Missoula physician who prescribes
the lethal medication, says he has transferred patients to hospice, to relatives’ homes, even 
to extended-stay hotels to avoid conflict [with Veterans Administration facilities].”). 
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comparison to the highly restrictive MAiD statutes, judicial recognition 
that a physician’s medical practice can include helping a patient to die 
would seem an attractive avenue for advancing those interests.
In a recent Article specifically about North Carolina law, which does 
not have specific criminal or civil laws prohibiting assisting suicide, 
Kathryn Tucker, Executive Director of the nonprofit End of Life Liberty
Project, argues that physician-assisted suicide is part of “health care” that 
physicians can provide lawfully within the existing standard of care; there 
is no need for a MAiD statute or judicial decision.194  Indeed, Tucker argues
that “[e]nacting statutes modeled after the Oregon Death with Dignity Act 
serves no necessary or useful purpose . . . and indeed stifles the evolution 
of the practice that would occur in a standard of care environment.”195  It
is possible that some physicians take that view; there is only limited empirical 
data about physician assistance that occurs outside of MAiD statutory 
contexts.196  Tucker writes that medical aid in dying “has been openly practiced 
in Montana since 2009,”197 but she does not provide or cite to any empirical 
evidence to support that claim.198  Even if such activity is occurring, there
is no assurance that the physician, pharmacist, and other involved medical 
care provider would escape being a “test case” prosecution if a physician 
wrote a lethal dose prescription, a pharmacist filled it, and a patient then 
consumed it for the purpose of ending the patient’s own life. Without 
a declaratory judgment or decision such as Baxter, there is risk.  Even with 
194. Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying in North Carolina, 97 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM
1, 2, 17 (2019). 
195. Id. at 5 n.15 (“The time has come to abandon this way of thinking [enacting PAS 
statutes]–to put an end to end-of-life law.” (citing Lois Shepherd, The End of the End-of-
Life Law, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (2014))). 
196. Id. at 17; see also Pope & Anderson, supra note 105, at 381 n.129 (“[F]ourteen
of the fifty-eight physicians who had been asked by patients to administer lethal injections 
complied with those requests.” (citing Anthony J. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275 JAMA 
919, 921 (1996))). 
197. Tucker, supra note 194, at 17–18. 
198. Similarly, John Carbone, Aditi Sethi-Brown, Beth Rosenberg, and Haider Warraich
report that there is no evidence of any prosecution of physicians for providing medical aid 
in dying.  John Carbone et al., Aid in Dying in North Carolina, 80 N.C. Med J. 128, 128 
(2019), http://www.ncmedicaljournal.com/content/80/2/128.full [https://perma.cc/Y3GK-
JX7D]. But see Aleccia, supra note 193 (identifying a Missoula physician who does prescribe 
lethal dose medication).  Ezekiel J. Emanuel, E.R. Daniels, D.L. Fairclough, and B.R.
Clarridge reported in 1998 that 15.8% of fifty-six oncologists participating in “structured 
in-depth” telephone interviews said that they had provided euthanasia or physician assistance
in dying.  Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 
in the United States: Adherence to Proposed Safeguards and Effects on Physicians, 280 
JAMA 507, 508 (1998).  Thus, there could be some cases of euthanasia or medical aid in dying 
occurring in many states in the United States without direct relationship to the existence
of MAiD statutes or, in the case of Montana, without direct relationship to Baxter v. State. 
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a Baxter-type decision, there is risk that the holding in Baxter would not 
cover a particular situation that could be distinguishable. 
North Carolina law lacks any prohibition on assisting suicide, let alone
an explicit prohibition on a physician’s provision of aid in dying.  An End
of Life Option Act was proposed in the 2017–2018 session but did not
advance in that session or the 2018–2019 session.199  That proposed MAiD 
statute was not unusual in that it, like other MAiD statutes, contained 
extensive requirements that both patients and physicians would have to 
meet before a physician would be able to provide medical aid in dying.200 
Until and unless such a law is enacted in North Carolina, however, a lack 
of explicit prohibition does not mean that physicians would necessarily be 
safe from prosecution under homicide or wrongful death statutes.201  Cautious 
physicians concerned about retention of their medical practice licenses 
and exposure to civil litigation or criminal prosecution might do well to 
follow lawsuits underway in other jurisdictions. 
One such case is in Massachusetts, a state that does not have a prohibition 
on assisting suicide but that does have a statement against “suicide or mercy 
killing” or “any affirmative or deliberate act to end one’s own life.”202  On
October 24, 2016, Roger Kligler and his physician, Alan Steinbach, filed 
a complaint seeking a “declaration that Medical Aid in Dying is not a criminal 
offense under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, or in the 
199. H.B. 879, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2019). Whether the legislature 
will enact a MAiD statute at some point is not predictable.  According to Nolo Press, North 
Carolina has previously considered and rejected such a law.  North Carolina’s End of Life 
Option Act, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/north-carolinas-death-with-
dignity-act.html [https://perma.cc/87BN-ZXJ8].  “Spurred by Maynard’s decision and the
resulting publicity, North Carolina legislators introduced a death with dignity bill for the 
first time in 2015.  That bill and another introduced in 2017 failed to pass.”  Id.  House Bill 789 
was still sitting in the Committee on Rules, Calendar and Operations at the close of the 2017–
2018 legislative session, and the same has occurred with the most recent End of Life Option
Act in the 2019–2020 legislative session.  See House Bill 879, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https:// 
www.ncleg.gov/BillLookUp/2019/HB879 [https://perma.cc/5Y3V-QD9W].  It was referred
to the House Committee on Rules, Calendar, and Operations on April 22, 2019, and nothing 
has happened to it since.  Id. 
200. N.C. H.R. 879. 
201. A physician might also be exposed to medical licensing or medical malpractice 
insurance issues.  For discussion of state medical licensing and disciplinary action risks for 
physician-assisted suicide, see generally supra note 49. 
202. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § 12 (West 2019).  For suicide or mercy killing,
the statute provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to constitute, condone, 
authorize, or approve suicide or mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act to 
end one’s own life other than to permit the natural process of dying.”  Id. 
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alternative, a declaration that prosecution of physicians who provide Medical
Aid in Dying is unlawful and unconstitutional as applied [in the Medical
Aid in Dying context].”203  The plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss, but
the court stated “[t]he complexity of establishing the parameters of a right 
to physician assisted suicide ultimately may militate against recognition 
of such a right.”204  The court denied plaintiffs’ summary judgement motion 
on January 14, 2020, except for holding that Massachusetts physicians can 
advise patients about medical aid-in-dying options that are lawfully available 
in other jurisdictions.205 Compassion & Choices filed a notice of appeal on 
February 26, 2020.206 
A court in Hawaii, another jurisdiction without a criminal prohibition
against medical aid in dying at the time of the lawsuit, also dismissed such
a case stating, “the relief sought by the plaintiffs is political, not judicial, 
in nature and should be addressed by the political branches of government.”207 
Hawaii subsequently did enact a MAiD statute, which is modeled on MAiD 
statutes previously enacted in other states.208  While Tucker persuasively 
advocates for legal recognition of a standard of care that includes medical 
aid in dying to avoid highly restrictive MAiD statutes, the track record in 
Hawaii and other states is not a basis for optimism.  Indeed, such lawsuits 
could prompt legislative attempts to explicitly prohibit MAiD as easily as 
they could prompt legislative enactment of MAiD statutes. 
There are similar lawsuits in New York209 and California.210  The petitioners
in these cases claim that physician assistance provided to a terminally ill, 
mentally competent individual seeking to end his or her life is not within 
203. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 2, Kligler v. Healey,
No. SUCV201603254F, 2017 WL 2803074 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 31, 2017) (Civ. Action 
No. 16-3254F).
204. Kligler, 2017 WL 2803074, at *1, *3. 
205. Kligler v. Healey, No. SUCV201603254F, 2020 WL 736968, at *12 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2020); see also Shira Schoenberg, Massachusetts Court Considers Whether to 
Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide, MASSLIVE (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.masslive. 
com/news/2019/03/massachusetts-court-considers-whether-to-legalize-physician-assisted- 
suicide.html [https://perma.cc/N9BR-3QGQ] (“Suffolk Superior Judge Mary Ames held
a hearing Tuesday [March 26, 2019,] on motions to dismiss the case.”). 
206. Notice of Appeal, Kligler, No. SUCV201603254F (Mass. Sup. Ct. Feb. 26, 2020).
207. See Osher, supra note 96.
208.  H.B. 2739, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018). 
209. See generally Myers v. Schneiderman, 31 N.Y.S.3d 45 (App. Div. 2016), aff’d, 
85 N.E.3d 57 (N.Y. 2017). 
210. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Brody
v. Harris, (Cal. Super. Ct. May 8, 2015) (No. CGC-15-544806) (arguing that § 401 of the
California Penal Code, or the “Assisted Suicide Statute,” provides that, “‘every person who 
deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony,’
does not encompass the conduct of a licensed physician providing aid in dying to a mentally
competent, terminally ill patient who has requested such assistance” (quoting CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 401 (West 2019) (amended 2018))). 
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the scope of those jurisdictions’ prohibitions on assisting suicide.  Courts
in each of those jurisdictions rejected that argument,211 leaving in place
risk of prosecution if a physician, pharmacist, or other health care provider 
assists an individual to die.  The legal starting point for such a case is different 
in North Carolina and Massachusetts since those jurisdictions lack an explicit 
prohibition on medical aid in dying, but a cautious physician might want 
to bring a suit seeking a judicial declaration of the legality of one’s provision 
of medical aid in dying. 
Even if a court, like the Montana Supreme Court in Baxter, were to 
validate the lawfulness of physician assistance in a particular case of a 
specific patient before the court, such a decision could not provide as much
clarity as a statute because it cannot anticipate all possible physician-patient 
scenarios.  Risks associated with such ambiguity could result in a self-
protective response among Montana physicians and pharmacists who might
well want more certainty before assisting a terminally ill, suffering individual. 
This understandable caution would inevitably result in similarly situated
individuals receiving different kinds of opportunities, depending on their 
own and their physicians’ knowledge and courage.  It turns out then, that 
this aid-in-dying nonprofit advocacy approach is no more likely to be 
successful than the MAiD approach.  Perhaps it could be said that compassion 
gaps in this context are borne of insufficient specificity to be reassuring 
and helpful to physicians wanting to help patients, while compassion gaps 
in the aid-in-dying statutes arise from excessive specificity, which burdens 
both physicians and patients who seek to use the statutes. 
IV. TAX-EXEMPT STATUS REQUIREMENTS OF AID-IN-DYING 
NONPROFITS 
Part II of this Article reviewed the extent to which the laws in the vast 
majority of states prohibit assisting another to commit suicide.  If, in order 
to receive the most financially beneficial tax-exempt I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
status, nonprofit organizations’ missions and activities must not be illegal, 
violate public policy, or focus on legislative lobbying, how can aid-in-dying
211. In New York, the court held that this was a matter for the legislature. Myers, 31
N.Y.S.3d at 65.  The New York legislature has considered a medical aid-in-dying statute 
three times without enacting one.  James Gormly, State’s Highest Court Rules There Is No 









   
 
 
   
 
  
    
 
       
    






   
    
      
 
  
nonprofits do all of the things described in Part III of this Article? Aid-
in-dying nonprofits assist some individuals seeking aid in dying, encourage
physicians to assist such individuals, and pursue statutory and common
law advances to make aid in dying more accessible.212 Viewed from the
perspective of compassion for those suffering irremediably at the end of 
life, these activities are not radical.  However, viewed from the perspective of 
current law, which embodies stigma associated with suicide and physicians’ 
training to avoid causing their patients to die, these activities are radical.  
If regulators grant these organizations preferred tax status, taxpayers will
be supporting these activities in the amount of tax exemptions and
deductions these organizations and their donors receive, respectively.213 
What then do regulators do, and what should they do about aid-in-dying
nonprofits? The short answer to this question is that interpreters of the
law must allow for reasonable interpretations of the requirements in this
and other similar social movement contexts, if the goal of moving ideas 
from the margin to the mainstream of society is a recognized value of tax-
exempt organizational contributions to society.  Regulators do, in fact,
allow for considerable activity, including through use of a relatively
narrow definition of “legislative lobbying”—a mechanism through which
social change can affect legal change through nonprofit activism.214 
A. Violation of Public Policy 
That the purpose and activities of a nonprofit organization cannot violate 
public policy is both a state and federal law requirement.215  The U.S.
Supreme Court held in Bob Jones University v. United States that race-based 
classifications and rules violate the requirement that an organization seeking 
212. E.g., About Us, supra note 86 (exemplifying one aid-in-dying nonprofit’s mission
of helping individuals, physicians, and the passing of laws to help people hasten their own 
deaths).
213. This is the “subsidy theory.” See Atkinson, supra note 35, at 404; see also Hansmann, 
supra note 35, at 66. 
214.  The prohibition of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) from legislative lobbying may be more about
preventing disproportionate voice of particularly wealthy donors who would receive a tax 
deduction for contributions to legislative objectives than limiting nonprofit participation.  
Such donors can participate substantially through I.R.C § 501(c)(4) organizations, which 
are also tax exempt but do not provide tax deductibility of donations.  Indeed, the rule that 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations can respond to legislators’ requests for input, without imperiling
their status under the I.R.C. § 501(h), suggests that limiting participation is not the primary 
objective of the limitation on legislative lobbying by nonprofits. 
215.  For federal requirements, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 
585–86 (1983); IRS, supra note 78 (“The Supreme Court stated [in Bob Jones University]
that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law standards of 
charity—namely that an institution seeking tax exempt status must serve a public purpose 
and not be contrary to established public policy.”). 
194
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tax-exempt status cannot violate public policy and must serve a charitable 
purpose, even if the race-based discrimination is grounded in religious
beliefs.216  However, the Internal Revenue Service has not used public
policy justifications for denying or revoking an organization’s tax-exempt 
status since the Bob Jones University decision.217  In the case of aid in 
dying specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg 
explicitly allowed for aid-in-dying legal development at the state level.218 
While not an endorsement of any particular approach, the Court’s opinion
signals that the mere existence of state laws enabling aid in dying, and
nonprofit organizations designed to work within those laws, would not
violate federal public policy.219 
At the state level, organizations encounter the same type of requirement 
—that they not violate public policy—when they seek to incorporate under 
state law as a nonprofit organization.220  As a historical matter, some states 
refused nonprofit applications when a proposed nonprofit would replicate 
the work of other nonprofits in the area and cause “market saturation,” or 
when the proposed nonprofit’s mission focused on changing the law or 
providing education that could lead to violating the law.221 Now, however,
state regulators accept incorporation applications for “any lawful purpose,” 
without much apparent scrutiny.222  Even the Euthanasia Research and 
216. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604. 
217. In 1984, the IRS stated that no other type of discrimination, such as “sex 
discrimination,” had been prohibited as clearly as race-based discrimination.  IRS, UPDATE 
ON PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND IMPACT OF BOB JONES UNIVERSITY V. U.S. (1984), https://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb84.pdf [https://perma.cc/TWJ4-AJP9].  It compared the existence 
of civil rights legislation with the absence of an Equal Rights Amendment and stated that 
it would monitor the development of public policy as to other types of discrimination.  Id.  
218.  521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
219.  Id. at 735 n.24. 
220. States vary in their specific nonprofit incorporation requirements, but “public 
benefit” or “public charity” organizations seeking tax exemption must meet or exceed the 
“charitability” definitional requirements equivalent to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations and 
must seek incorporation with missions that provide public benefit.  Differences emerge 
within and among states with regard to the definition of charitability for tax exemptions from 
property tax, income, and sales and use taxes.  ELIZABETH SCHMIDT, NONPROFIT LAW: THE 
LIFE CYCLE OF A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 239–43 (2d ed. 2017). 
221. Id. at 53. 
222. Id. But see Michael Kimmelman, What D’Ya Call a House of Sex? A Museum. 
Oh., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/18/arts/what-d-ya-call-
a-house-of-sex-a-museum-oh.html [https://perma.cc/5MFX-YWMV]. New York Board
of Regents denied an application for a sex museum because it would “make a mockery of 
the institution of the museum.”  Id.  The museum was established as a for-profit organization 
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Guidance Organization, which is the primary financial sponsor of a group 
dedicated to finding effective and efficient means of ending one’s life,223 
is a registered nonprofit in Oregon and a recognized I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
organization.224 
B. Illegal Conduct
If illegal activities are required to fulfill an organization’s mission, it
cannot qualify as a tax-exempt organization.225  Final Exit Network was
successfully prosecuted for “assisting a suicide” in Minnesota because the 
Minnesota Supreme Court accepts the interpretation that speech about
life-ending methods directed to someone the speaker knows is intending 
to commit suicide is unlawful as “assisting suicide.”226  However, FEN 
did not lose its tax-exempt status.227  FEN did not intentionally violate any 
law, and having exhausted all legal avenues to contest that decision, FEN 
is no longer providing assistance to people living in Minnesota.228 
MAiD statutes create the lawful conditions under which a physician can 
prescribe a lethal dose prescription, but if Congress decided to amend the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA)229 to exclude the use of prescription 
medications for MAiD purposes, compliance with MAiD statutes and 
focusing nonprofit activity on MAiD statutes would be unlawful. 
C. Charitable Activity 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requires an organization’s mission and activities to 
be “charitable,” and the statute itself provides for several categories 
instead of a public benefit charitable organization. Id. The Museum of Sex in New York 
is now a registered private foundation, which is a type of nonprofit organization, and provides 
donation receipts acceptable for tax deduction purposes. Support, MUSEUM SEX, https://www.
museumofsex.com/museum/corporate/support/ [https://perma.cc/S2M4-85RQ].
223. Help Ergo in Its Work To Achieve Choices in Dying, FINAL EXIT, http://www.
finalexit.org/ergo_membership.html [https://perma.cc/KW2F-DJEK]. 
224. Euthanasia Research & Guidance Organization, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://
www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.profile&ein=931118314 [https://perma.cc/ 
5X9H-Y747]; see Charitable Activities Registered in Oregon, OR. DEP’T JUST., https://justice.
oregon.gov/charities [https://perma.cc/3FXY-RH7U] (search for “Euthanasia Research and
Guidance Organization” under “Charitable Organizations Registered in Oregon,” to show 
current registration number 20375 in the charitable organizations division of the Oregon 
Department of Justice). 
225. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983). 
226. See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
227. See Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 63. 
228. See History of Final Exit Network, FINAL EXIT NETWORK, http://www.final
exitnetwork.org/About-Us.html [https://perma.cc/7BHA-A3YG]. 
229. See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
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of charitable endeavors.230 As in the cases of public policy and illegal
conduct, how the IRS interprets this requirement significantly influences 
the extent to which aid-in-dying nonprofits can move ideas into the mainstream 
of society.
Almost all aid-in-dying nonprofits are classified as “educational” 
organizations.  This is partially due to the nature of I.R.C. §501(c)(3) 
categorical options231 and a matter of historical development.  One of the
earliest, if not the earliest, aid-in-dying organizations was the Hemlock 
Society, which was founded by Derek Humphry in 1980 and existed until 
2003.232  In regard to the organization’s work: 
“Hemlock had two strings to its bow,” Humphry says.  “One, to help people who
were suffering and wanted to die because of their terminal illness in whatever
way we could without getting into trouble. . . . And two, change the law to permit 
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill—not for any old, depressed
person.”233 
From this starting point, other nonprofit organizations identified in this 
Article emerged with these same goals of lawful organizational conduct 
to assist those currently suffering irremediably at the end of life while
carefully distinguishing between transient and persistent commitments to
end life, and also to advocate for legal reform to encourage compassionate 
responses to such suffering in the future. 
Derek Humphry has also served as an early and continuing advisor to
Final Exit Network,234 whose mission statement reads as follows: “To 
serve those who are suffering intolerably from an incurable condition which 
has become more than they can bear and to increase the awareness of all 
Americans concerning their basic human right to a death with dignity.”235 
230. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (covering “[c]orporations . . . organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literacy, or educational 
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part 
of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals”). 
231. Id.
 232. Luke Turf, Exit This Way, WESTWORD (June 8, 2006, 4:00 AM), https://www. 
westword.com/news/exit-this-way-5089577 [https://perma.cc/4XPP-VZ53]; History of Final 
Exit Network, supra note 228. 
233. Turf, supra note 232. 
234. History of Final Exit Network, supra note 228. 
235. FINAL EXIT NETWORK, INC., FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT 
FROM INCOME TAX (2016), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/800/80011
9137/800119137_201706_990.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8BG-HDQU]. 
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Similarly, End of Life Washington’s mission states that it “[p]rovides 
advocacy, resources, and support to people facing terminal illness and
their loved ones.”236  The mission statement for Compassion & Choices
reads: “To educate, support, and advocate for patient rights at the end of life.”237 
These read very similarly because of their classification as educational
organizations. Although Final Exit Network looks very different from 
End of Life Washington when it comes to the specific services they provide
seekers of aid in dying, they are all the same as to their relationship to the 
Internal Revenue Service: They are educational charitable organizations.238 
IRS regulations of educational organizations begin with a definition of
educational as pertaining to “(a) The instruction or training of the individual
for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities; or (b) The 
instruction of the public on subjects useful to the individual and beneficial 
to the community.”239 A potential hurdle for aid-in-dying organizations is
Treasury Regulation §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3), which states: 
An organization may be educational even though it advocates a particular
position or viewpoint so long as it presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition
of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an
independent opinion or conclusion.  On the other hand, an organization is not
educational if its principal function is the mere presentation of unsupported 
opinion.240 
It would be quite burdensome to the organizations and those they serve
if aid-in-dying organizations had to give a “full and fair exposition” of all
end-of-life options including continued or new treatment options, palliative
care, voluntary stopping of eating and drinking,241 right to try options,242 
236. END OF LIFE WASH., FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME 
TAX (2016), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/911/911412987/911412987_ 
201706_990.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX6X-4682]. 
237. COMPASSION & CHOICES, FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM 
INCOME TAX, (2015), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/841/841328829/ 
841328829_201606_990.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TVA-HAT8].
238. See We Serve, FINAL EXIT NETWORK, http://www.finalexitnetwork.org/Home. 
html [https://perma.cc/3C3X-2A69].
239.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (2012). 
240. Id. (emphasis added). 
241. A full description of VSED and its legality is provided by health law scholar
and bioethicist Thaddeus Pope.  See Thaddeus Mason Pope, VSED—Voluntarily Stopping 
Eating & Drinking, THADDEUS POPE, http://thaddeuspope.com/vsed.html [https://perma.cc/
8R9E-6TVX]; see also Pope & Anderson, supra note 105. 
242. “Right to try” is the right to try investigational drugs that have not yet been
approved by the FDA, despite the patient’s not having been included in a clinical trial.  What Is 
Right to Try?, RIGHT TO TRY, http://righttotry.org/about-right-to-try [https://perma.cc/ 
7VVZ-YK3Z].  Many states have right to try laws, but federal law now also provides access to
a patient if the patient has a life-threatening illness, has exhausted all available forms of 
treatment, inability to participate in a clinical trial, and provides informed consent. Id.
198
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and terminal sedation243 in order to educate people about medical aid in
dying.  Indeed, opponents of MAiD statutes have sought inclusion of just 
such a requirement.244 
Although the literal words of Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)
would seem to require the provision of that information as “sufficiently
full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts,” an appellate court decided
in 1980 that the “full and fair exposition” requirement was unconstitutionally
vague.245  Over the next few years, the IRS developed and legally tested a
“methodology test” to clarify what is meant by “full and fair exposition.”246 
This test does not require aid-in-dying organizations to provide information 
about continuing treatment, palliative care, or alternative means of ending 
one’s life, such as voluntary stopping of eating and drinking.
According to current guidelines, an educational organization or its
materials fail the methodology test to determine whether there has been
“sufficiently full and fair exposition of pertinent facts” if: (a) a significant 
portion of the presentation of the organization’s views in its educational 
materials is unsupported by facts; (b) facts purporting to support the 
organization’s views are distorted; (c) the organization’s educational materials 
make substantial use of inflammatory and disparaging terms, and the expression 
of views is based more on emotional than objective grounds; (d) the
organization’s materials are not aimed at developing understanding on the 
part of the intended audience because the organization fails to take the 
listener’s or reader’s background and training into account.247 
This methodology-focused test of full and fair exposition provides 
substantial room for aid-in-dying nonprofits to educate individuals and the 
community at large about a wide range of relevant topics without worry 
about legal challenge for failure to cover topics beyond those organizations’
chosen scope, as long as they do not distort the information they do provide.
Indeed, it is the definitional breadth of education under IRS treasury
regulations248 that grounds the opportunity for nonprofit educational
243. “Terminal sedation” involves deeply sedating a patient while not providing
hydration and nutrition, with the expectation that the patient will die from dehydration during 
sedation.  Johannes J.M. van Delden, Editorial, Terminal Sedation: Source of a Restless Ethical 
Debate, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 187, 187–88 (2007).  The choice to use terminal sedation is fraught 
with ethical issues.  Id. 
 244. See, e.g., infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
245. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1034–35 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
246.  Nat’l All. v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 871, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
247.  Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729, § 3.03. 
248. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (2019). 
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organizations to move ideas from the margins of society to the mainstream
and then into law, with the benefit of taxpayer support.  Due to this breadth, 
aid-in-dying organizations could play a powerful role in shifting attitudes 
about suicide as rational in some contexts and in enacting legal rules that 
allow those suffering irremediably at the end of life to end their lives
peacefully. This breadth of permissible education also means that organizations 
can take very different approaches to the same challenge of securing
greater autonomy in choice of end-of-life assistance and care.
By contrast, Minnesota’s current definition of education in the context 
of “assisted suicide” is quite narrow; one is unlawfully assisting suicide
and not lawfully educating about suicide if one provides specific information 
about suicide methods to someone the speaker knows is intending to 
commit suicide.249  Minnesota courts rejected FEN’s position that it only
educated people suffering irremediably from a terminal condition who 
approached them for information about how to die.250  In fact, this is the
core of FEN’s aid-in-dying legal reform effort: distinguishing education 
about suicide from assisting suicide.251  It is the means through which
ideas about rational suicide, hastening death, and assisting another to 
die can change dynamically over time.  While FEN’s situation illustrates 
this most dramatically, the same is true of the work of other aid-in-dying 
nonprofits that seek liberalization of laws and views about autonomy of 
patients to choose to end their lives as a rational approach to severe, 
unrelenting suffering at the end of life. 
D. Pursuit of Legal Reform 
If an organization is primarily devoted to legal reform, it does not
qualify as an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, and its donors’ contributions 
are not tax deductible.252  I.R.C.  § 501(c)(3) states explicitly that no substantial
249. See supra text accompanying notes 129–32. 
250. See State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., 889 N.W.2d 296, 299–300 (Minn. Ct. App.
2016), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 145 (2017) (mem.). 
251. The constraining variable in the educational nonprofit context is not the definition
of “education” as much as it is the money available to accomplish the organization’s mission. 
Financial support from the general public is important as a source of funds that are not available 
from the financial sector and, also, to maintain the most desired status as an Internal Revenue
Code § 501(c)(3).  Generally, at least one-third of an organization’s funds must come from 
the general public, or the organization loses that preferential status that enables donors to 
take charitable deductions and for organizations to enjoy such benefits as freedom from income 
tax, including investment income tax.  One measure of the strength of a nonprofit organization 
is the number of volunteers willing to participate in and to support its activities.  A high level 
of public support and participation indicate that the organization is truly working to benefit 
the public, as required of a public benefit organization.  See I.R.C. § 509 (2012). 
252. Id. § 501(c)(3) (stating explicitly that “no substantial part” of a I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
organization’s activities can consist of attempting “to influence legislation”). 
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part of an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization’s activities can consist of 
“attempting, to influence legislation.”  Such an organization could qualify 
as an I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), but it would be classified as a “social welfare”
organization and, as such, would be unable to accept tax-deductible donations
for its work.253  One simple way to address this is for an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),
which accepts tax-deductible donations, to establish an I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) 
to do legislative work and accept non-tax-deductible donations exclusively 
for that work.  Aid-in-dying nonprofit, Death with Dignity National Center, 
has both types of organizations, but most other aid-in-dying nonprofits 
account for their legal advocacy and the volume of their other activities in 
ways that enable them to claim that it is not a substantial part of the organization’s 
activities.254  In this way, the organizations can attract tax-deductible
contributions and legitimately hold themselves out as charitable educational 
organizations rather than social welfare organizations. 
It is generally the case that nonprofits must engage in some legislative
and other legal reform activities if they are going to generate change in the
law and society. Many I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization managers believe 
that they should avoid legislative lobbying and legal reform,255 yet IRS rules
since 1976 allow for considerable lobbying and much legal reform does 
not even fall into the category of legislative lobbying.256  FEN’s litigation
about common law definitions of assisting suicide could change the law 
jurisdiction by jurisdiction but would not count as legislative lobbying.  
Nor would the litigation and advocacy work of Compassion & Choices 
and End of Life Liberty Project in pursuit of legal validation that physicians 
can, as a matter of their license to practice medicine, prescribe a lethal dose 
of medication when requested and warranted by a patient’s circumstances. 
253.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(v). 
254. About Us, supra note 86. 
255. Nayantara Mehta, Nonprofits and Lobbying: Yes, They Can!, 18 ABA BUS. L. 
SEC. (Mar./Apr. 2009), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2009-03-04/mehta.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/R2VP-TTMG] (“There is a widespread perception that nonprofits cannot 
lobby, or if they do lobby, they are exploiting some kind of legal loophole.”). 
256. Marcia A. Avner, Advocacy, Lobbying, and Social Change, in THE JOSSEY-BASS 
HANDBOOK OF NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 31, at 396, 400. 
In 1976 legislation was passed that clarified and vastly expanded the amount of 
lobbying nonprofits can conduct.  Equally important, on August 31, 1990, the Internal 
Revenue Service promulgated regulations that support both the spirit and the intent 
of the 1976 law.  Together the law and the regulations provide more lobbying 
leeway than 99 percent of all nonprofits will ever need or want. 
Id. (quoting Bob Smucker, Nonprofit Lobbying, in THE JOSSEY-BASS HANDBOOK OF 
NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 230, 231–32 (2d ed. 2005)). 
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Without running afoul of the IRS requirement that I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) 
organizations must not engage in substantial legislative lobbying, many 
aid-in-dying organizations lobby extensively for legislative change. Equally
important is their vigorous opposition to attempts to weaken existing aid-
in-dying laws.  One early challenge concerned the federal Controlled 
Substances Act.  After the federal Drug Enforcement Agency issued an
opinion in 1997 that lethal dose prescriptions were not written for a 
“legitimate medical purpose,” Attorney General Janet Reno responded in 
1998 with a contrary opinion, echoing the Supreme Court in Washington
v. Glucksberg, that the CSA was not “intended to displace the states as the
primary regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state’s 
determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice.”257  Then
in 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft took the position that aid in 
dying was not a “legitimate medical purpose” for prescribing lethal dose 
prescriptions, even if provided as allowed in states with MAiD statutes.258 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided in Gonzales v. Oregon that the CSA 
as enacted did not confer authority on the Attorney General to prohibit
Oregon physicians from assisting patients as allowed by MAiD statutes.259 
Since Congress could amend the CSA to prohibit using controlled substances
for MAiD, aid-in-dying nonprofits must remain vigilant.
Another example of the need for constant vigilance and activism arose 
very soon after the District of Columbia passed its Death with Dignity 
Act, which went into effect February 18, 2017.260  In 2018, the House of
Representatives passed a provision in the federal budget to defund the 
reporting requirements of D.C.’s Death with Dignity Act.261  If that budget
provision had passed the Senate, the defunding requirement would have 
nullified the Death with Dignity Act.  Death with Dignity National Center 
257. Statement of Attorney General Janet Reno on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, 
No. 259, (June 5, 1998), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/June/259ag.htm.html [https:// 
perma.cc/TJH6-6XYW]. 
258. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. 1306 (2012)). 
259.  546 U.S. 243, 247 (2006). 
260. D.C. CODE §§ 7-661.01-7 to .16 (2019). 
261. Melissa Bailey, Right-To-Die Fight Hits National Stage, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://khn.org/news/right-to-die-fight-hits-national-stage [https://perma.cc/
BCQ7-WW3H]; Mikaela Lefrak & Martin Austermuhle, Congress Moves to Overturn D.C.
‘Death with Dignity Law,’ NPR (Feb. 14, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/ 
14/515228620/congress-moves-to-overturn-d-c-death-with-dignity-law [https://perma.cc/
Q9KL-QKC2]; Mikaela Lefrak, Trump Budget Aims To Block Funding for D.C. Death 
with Dignity Law, WAMU (May 23, 2017), https://wamu.org/story/17/05/23/trump-budget-
aims-block-funding-d-c-death-dignity-law [https://perma.cc/28W2-RYEW].
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and other aid-in-dying organizations successfully lobbied to prevent passage 
in the Senate.262 
Yet another federal rule that federal funds cannot be used to assist veterans 
seeking to use a MAiD statute263 has resulted in access difficulties for veterans 
in all MAiD states except for Washington.264  Each state’s department of 
veterans affairs decides how to implement federal rules, but Kathryn Tucker, 
Executive Director of End of Life Liberty Project, contends that most are 
taking an overly expansive approach.265 Tucker persuasively argues that
“[n]othing exists in the federal statute’s language that would prohibit 
a resident from receiving aid-in-dying services at state homes, so long as 
they are not provided using federal funds or employees.”266 
Another recent example of federal level defensive advocacy is End of 
Life Washington’s successful work with the Washington State Attorney 
General to invalidate the Trump administration “conscience rule.”267 The
262. District of Columbia, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/
states/district-of-columbia [https://perma.cc/2J7Y-UNMV] (describing its advocacy efforts);
see also Kim Callinan, End-of-Life Group Thanks Senate for Rejecting House Rider to Repeal 
D.C. Death with Dignity Act, COMPASSION & CHOICES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://compassionand 
choices.org/news/end-life-group-thanks-senate-rejecting-house-rider-repeal-d-c-death-
dignity-act [https://perma.cc/ZDD3-PL4S]. 
263.  The language of the federal rule is: 
It is the purpose of this chapter to continue current Federal policy by providing 
explicitly that Federal funds may not be used to pay for items and services (including 
assistance) the purpose of which is to cause (or assist in causing) the suicide, 
euthanasia, or mercy killing of any individual. 
42 U.S.C. § 14401(b) (2012). 
264. JoNel Aleccia, supra note 193. 
265.  Id. 
 266. Id.
267. E-mail from Robb Miller, former Exec. Dir. & Bd. Member, End of Life Wash., 
to Taimie Bryant, Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law (May 24, 2019) (on file with
author). On November 21, 2019, the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington 
invalidated the rule in its entirety.  Washington v. Azar, No. 2:19-cv-00183-SAB, 2019 WL
6219541, at *12–13 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2019) (agreeing with plaintiffs that “medical
care will be negatively impacted by the Rule [and that] . . . the Rule is arbitrary and capricious
because HHS disregarded the comments and evidence showing the Rule would severely 
and disproportionately harm certain vulnerable populations, including women; lesbian, 
gay bisexual, and transgender people (LGBT individuals); individuals with disabilities; 
and people living in rural areas” and finding, also, that the “Rule is arbitrary and capricious 
because HHS failed to conduct a reasoned analysis of the requirements of basic medical ethics 
in adopting the Rule”), appeal filed, No. 20-3544 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2020).  Several states’ 
attorneys general were similarly successful in their suit seeking invalidation of the rule.  
The District Court for the Southern District of New York invalidated the rule in its entirety.  
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conscience rule would have allowed health care institutions and providers 
to refuse, on religious or moral grounds, to provide services with which
the provider disagrees.268  All MAiD statutes have opt-out provisions, but
this could have provided for federal-level enforcement, including definitions 
of what constitutes objection and opting out, as well as potentially causing 
disparity of patient access within institutions that have not opted out.269 
Defensive aid-in-dying nonprofit advocacy is also regularly necessary
at the state level.  For instance, in the 2017 legislative session in Washington, 
proposed legislation would have added the requirement that physicians 
discuss with a patient “treatment for the purpose of cure, and treatment for 
the purpose of extending the patient’s life,” if a patient requests a lethal
dose prescription as provided under Washington’s Death with Dignity 
Act.270  Adding requirements to an already requirement-laden law reduces 
the likelihood of utilization because physicians will be concerned about 
missing or under-fulfilling a requirement such that they lose protection 
from prosecution or civil litigation.  There is also the burden of increased 
time expenditure.  Because there is no obligation to provide the prescription 
if a patient qualifies, physicians need not add on the uncertainty or burdens 
of time and paperwork associated with the law. 
Another example is a bill proposed in February 2018 in California,
which would have negative effects on California’s already elaborate End 
of Life Options Act.271  California Senate Bill 1336 would require the physician 
to request that an otherwise qualified individual inform the physician orally 
or in writing as to the motivating reason or reasons behind the individual’s 
decision to request the aid-in-dying drug.272  The question used to gather
this information would allow for the selection of multiple choices including, 
at a minimum, the following possible choices: “(A) Pain or the fear of pain.  
(B) Concern about being a burden to others.  (C) Loss of autonomy.  (D) Sense 
of hopelessness.”273  The proposal allows patients to decline to answer.274 
However, depending on how the physician approaches the matter or treats 
New York v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 414 F. Supp. 3d 475, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2019),
appeal filed, No. 20-41 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 2020). 
268. Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority,
84 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (May 21, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
269. See Law, supra note 171. 
270. S.B. 5433, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/
biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5433.pdf [https://perma.cc/B34Q-J6E4].  The 
bill did not become law.  SB 5433—2017–18, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE, https://app.leg.wa.gov/
billsummary?BillNumber=5433&Year=2017 [https://perma.cc/K86L-VECZ]. 
271.  S.B. 1336, 20017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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this information as important for deciding whether to grant or deny a patient’s
request, patients will perceive varying degrees of freedom to decline to answer.
A requirement such as this adds to an already long list of requirements 
physicians must follow or be at risk of prosecution and loss of licensure.
Moreover, answers patients give could be used against physicians.  For 
instance, if patients identify a sense of hopelessness, has the physician
missed a sign of need for mental health assessment if the physician has 
not ordered one?  Should the choice of “concern about being a burden to
others” alert the physician that there may be impermissible family member
coercion? If the patient chooses “pain or the fear of pain,” has the physician 
failed to provide enough information about palliative care options? 
It is difficult to overstate how important aid-in-dying nonprofit
organizations’ work is in countering proposals to weaken existing MAiD 
laws. Indeed, the Death with Dignity National Center maintains a website 
with current information on every state, including proposed laws and attempts 
to amend or repeal MAiD laws.275  Aid-in-dying nonprofits do not initiate
these proposals, yet they must exercise vigilance about how much of such 
work they are doing because of IRS rules that limit legislative lobbying.  
Moreover, organizations cannot simply consider this work a form of 
“education.”  Education in the legislative context—lobbying—is more 
circumscribed than education in other contexts for fear that some wealthy 
donors, whose identities the nonprofit does not have to reveal to the public, 
will play a disproportionate and hidden role in shaping laws.276  And yet,
despite the limitation of such activities to no substantial part277 of the
organization’s activities, the regulations and laws in this area allow quite 
a bit of legislative activity. 
275. Maine, supra note 144. 
276.  That partisan donors can give large amounts of money anonymously to nonprofits,
swaying the development of law and policy on the basis of their donations, has given rise 
to debate about limitations for tax deductibility of donations.  See, e.g., David Callahan, The 
Price of Privacy: Four Problems with Anonymous Giving—and a Case for Reform, INSIDE 
PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.insidephilanthropy.com/home/2016/11/17/the-
price-of-privacy-four-problems-with-anonymous-givingand-the-case-for-reform [https:// 
perma.cc/WM38-5UVS] (“[W]hen wealthy donors speak loudly in the public square, using
nonprofit proxies, citizens deserve to know who they are, along with what motives they may 
have—and all the more so when donors are using tax-subsidized dollars.”); Kristin A.
Goss, Policy Plutocrats: How America’s Wealthy Seek to Influence Governance, 49 AM.
POL. SCI. ASS’N 442, 442–43 (2016). 
277.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
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The general rule presented in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) is that “no substantial
part of the activities [of the organization can be] carrying on propaganda 
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”278  If an organization
conducts lobbying, there is no way to know in advance the limit of the no 
substantial part test. The test considers both financial investments and 
volunteer lobbying, but there is no definition of lobbying and no specific 
rule regarding how much is too much.279  All aid-in-dying nonprofits
provide a variety of time and labor-intensive client services such that 
legislative lobbying could easily appear insubstantial.280  However, even
if the risk of violating the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) no substantial part test is low, 
the consequences of violation are severe: revocation of the organization’s 
tax-exempt status.281 
By contrast, an organization can predict with certainty how the no 
substantial part test will play out if it makes the I.R.C. § 501(h) election. 
This test is accompanied by detailed regulations that define “influencing 
legislation” and “lobbying expenditures.”282  The test is strictly financial, 
in accordance with a formula derived from the organization’s “exempt purpose 
expenditures” that year.283  Organizations that elect the I.R.C. § 501(h)
test can involve unlimited numbers of volunteers in lobbying without any 
impact on their I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status.  Such volunteer activity is invisible 
in the context of a purely financial calculation.  Also, there are numerous 
statutory exceptions, such as work in response to a legislator’s request for 
the organization’s input on proposed legislation, which would not count 
as legislative lobbying.284  Moreover, organizations would have to exceed 
allowed lobbying amounts by 150% for four years before running the risk 
of loss of tax-exempt status.285  There is an excise tax on excessive lobbying,
278. Id. 
279. See Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, IRS (Dec. 13, 2018), https:// 
www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/measuring-lobbying-substantial-part-test [https://perma.cc/
27WD-VAXK].
280. For instance, aid-in-dying nonprofits provide information about MAiD statutory
requirements, find physicians willing to write lethal dose prescriptions for qualified patients, 
assist the patient and family members with the pragmatic aspects of using MAiD statutes, and 
provide information about advance health care planning and various types of palliative care 
options.
281. See I.R.C. § 503(a)(1) (2012). 
282. Id. § 501(h)(2).
283. Measuring Lobbying Activity: Expenditure Test, IRS (Feb. 25, 2019), https:// 
www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/measuring-lobbying-activity-expenditure-test [https://
perma.cc/V29Q-AL4B].
284. See I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2) (2012). 
285. See id. § 501(h)(1)(B); Measuring Lobbying Activity: Expenditure Test, supra note
283. 
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but the calculation is generous to nonprofit organizations.286  The consequence
of all of these rules is that an organization can attempt to influence legislation 
in numerous ways, without running afoul of the requirements of I.R.C. 
§ 501(h) or endangering its I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status. 
Nonprofit organizations working on aid in dying have been adept at using 
all of these Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulation opportunities. 
Many different types of organizations are classified as educational 
organizations, educational materials and activities are broadly defined to 
include even some portions of fundraising materials, and rules about full
and fair exposition287 are generous and easy to follow.  Educational and
social action nonprofits currently working in the field of aid in dying have 
accomplished a lot through persistence, charismatic attraction of volunteers 
and supporters, and intelligent communication with all participants in the 
process of moving things forward.  Even as the substantive laws themselves 
are rife with what this Article has called compassion gaps, the legal capacity 
for nonprofits to change the law is considerable. 
Aid-in-dying organizations seek to disrupt and replace ideas about end-
of-life autonomy and options.  Some may characterize them as disruptive 
despite being public benefit charities. However, the way the rules pertaining
to nonprofits are interpreted suggests that they are public benefit charities 
because they are disruptive; disruption is a valued role for nonprofit 
organizations. The challenges aid-in-dying nonprofits face are not primarily 
grounded in the rules that allow them to attain and maintain their status as 
public benefit charities able to receive tax-deductible contributions to support
their disruptive missions.
The challenges aid-in-dying nonprofits face are grounded primarily in 
the legal and social contexts in which they seek change.  They are also
grounded in the fact that aid-in-dying nonprofits provide client services 
that instill a sense of urgency to secure lawful access to medical aid in dying.
Such urgency can lead to compromise legislation that is difficult subsequently 
to liberalize, thereby providing greater access to more individuals suffering 
at the end of life who would choose to die peacefully sooner than to die later 
after extended suffering.
286. See generally I.R.C. § 4911 (2012); Measuring Lobbying Activity: Expenditure Test,
supra note 283. 
287. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2012). 
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V. CONCLUSION
In 2014, the nonprofit Institute of Medicine288 released a report titled,
“Dying in America: Improving Quality and Honoring Individual Preferences 
Near the End of Life.”289  That report and another report released by the
Institute of Medicine the following year suggested that American end-of-
life care could be improved substantially and should reflect more opportunity
for individual access to palliative and other supportive assistance at the 
end of life.290  Polls also reveal substantial public support for greater end-
of-life autonomy in choosing to hasten death under some circumstances.291 
Since at least 1980, aid-in-dying nonprofits have been actively working 
on this issue in diverse and creative ways, supported by a tax status that 
enables them to receive tax-deductible donations.292  Yet, despite considerable
medical research and public support for choice to end one’s life under some 
circumstances, there are not many milestones of success.  At this point, there 
are no states other than Montana with affirmative common law protections 
for physicians to provide aid in dying,293 and courts in some states have 
explicitly rejected the opportunity to provide them.294  There are a small 
number of MAiD statutes, which even aid-in-dying nonprofits consider 
inadequate, and most proposed MAiD statutes are not enacted when first 
considered.295 FEN’s approach is vulnerable to vague definitions as to 
what constitutes assisting suicide,296 and in 2015, FEN was successfully 
prosecuted for assisting suicide in Minnesota, despite having done nothing 
288. The Institute of Medicine is a nonprofit organization focused on health care and 
affiliated with the National Academies of Science.  The Institute of Medicine, INST. FOR 
HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/resources/Pages/OtherWebsites/TheInstituteof 
Medicine.aspx [https://perma.cc/U5P3-MV9Q]. 
289. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 16. 
290. See id. at 7, 45–116, 407–41 (emphasizing need for continued expansion of access 
to palliative care, support for family oriented caregiving, and respect for end-of-life care 
centered on patient decisions). 
291. Span, supra note 172 (reporting that, since 2002, between 66%–69% of Americans 
have responded affirmatively when asked in annual surveys if aid in dying should be allowed 
under some circumstances).
292. See History of the End-of-Life Choice Movement, COMPASSION & CHOICES, https:// 
compassionandchoices.org/resource/history-end-life-choice-movement [https://perma.cc/
A5YF-MD7Y]; History of Final Exit Network, supra note 228. 
293. But see notes 203–05 and accompanying text (discussing the case Kligler v.
Healey pending in Massachusetts). 
294. See Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836, 857 (N.M. 2016).  For case law rejecting 
petitions for declaratory judgments that physician-provided aid in dying is legal, see also 
supra note 96. 
295. See MCEVOY, supra note 145, § 3.25. 
296. See supra Part II (discussing the problem of ambiguous statutory definitions for
“assisting” suicide). 
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more than provide information to a specific person in a specific private
context about how to die.297 
A. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits and the Stigma of Suicide
What accounts for the apparent gap between public support for end-of-
life options and the actual extremely limited availability of the option to
end one’s life as a legitimate, supported response to irremediable end-of-
life suffering? The answer to that question is not simply a matter of anti-
aid-in-dying nonprofits’ ability to effectively counter the advocacy of aid-
in-dying nonprofits.  Nor is it primarily about legislators being out of
touch with changing social values. After all, the extent of change in public 
attitudes is not clear, especially as long as suicide is stigmatized.298  Public
support drops if aid in dying is described in a way that invokes the idea of 
suicide.299  Accordingly, most aid-in-dying nonprofits in the United States 
vigorously deny that medical aid in dying is a subset of suicide—an acceptable 
type of suicide under the specific circumstances of irremediable end-of-
297. For a description of the prosecution and subsequent litigation, see supra notes
118–22 and accompanying text. 
298. See STEFAN, supra note 26, at 323–30; see also Lisa Schenker, Assisted-Suicide 
Focuses Attention on Palliative Care, Hospice Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 16, 2015, 
1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150516/MAGAZINE/305169982/ 
assisted-suicide-debate-focuses-attention-on-palliative-hospice-care [https://perma.cc/3XRP-
F72D] (“A Gallup poll last year found that 69% of Americans favored allowing doctors to 
‘end a patient’s life by some painless means,’ though that figure dropped to 58% when
people were asked if they supported allowing doctors to help incurable patients ‘commit
suicide.’”).  Gallup reported that of survey respondents between May 1–12, 2019, 79%
responded that suicide is “morally wrong.” Moral Issues, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/
poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx [https://perma.cc/5MEG-7WZP].  However, context appears 
to matter.  During the same time period, 44% of survey takers responded that “doctor-assisted 
suicide” is “morally wrong,” while 52% responded that it is “morally acceptable.”  Id. 
 299. Megan Brenan, Americans’ Strong Support for Euthanasia Persists, Gallup (May 
31, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235145/americans-strong-support-euthanasia-persists.
aspx [https://perma.cc/C9NU-QT5P] (“72% say doctors should be able to help terminally 
ill patients die.  Fewer, 65%, express support when the question includes ‘commit suicide.’”); 
Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for Euthanasia Depends on How It’s Described, Gallup (May
29, 2013), https://news.gallup.com/poll/162815/support-euthanasia-hinges-described.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6LKS-CXM6] (“In the same month that Vermont became the fourth state to
legalize physician-assisted suicide, a May 2–7 Gallup survey finds 70% of Americans in 
favor of allowing doctors to hasten a terminally ill patient’s death when the matter is described 
as allowing doctors to ‘end the patient’s life by some painless means.’  At the same time, 
far fewer—51%—support it when the process is described as doctors helping a patient 
‘commit suicide.’”).
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life suffering.300  They claim instead that medical aid in dying and suicide 
are opposites.301  Their purposes may include political expediency in passing 
MAiD statutes and avoidance of the application of laws that prohibit assisting 
suicide. 
Cholbi describes the emerging consensus among U.S. aid-in-dying 
nonprofits as “anti-suicide but pro-assisted dying.”302  He argues that, while
aid-in-dying nonprofits’ rhetorical strategy may be politically expedient 
in the short term, it ultimately harms development of a “right to die” and 
the right to make autonomous choices at the end of life for two linked 
reasons: (1) there is no defensible conceptual, actual, or moral distinction 
between seekers of suicide and seekers of assisted dying,303 and (2) rhetoric
that it is insulting to seekers of medical aid in dying to group them with 
seekers of suicide increases stigma associated with suicide.304  Accordingly, 
current advocacy choices could increase the stigma of suicide and hinder 
development of laws that provide meaningful access to aid in dying. 
This may partially explain the gap between apparent public receptivity
to medical aid in dying and limited, burdensome legislative outcomes. 
The public may support the general concept of aid in dying, but legislators 
must craft the actual laws containing the level of specificity believed sufficient
to guard against error and abuses.  Legislators grappling with the details
of particular MAiD statutory proposals cannot stay at the level of abstraction 
at which the public can be supportive of medical aid in dying by superficially 
distinguishing it from assisting suicide; the actual and moral similarities 
between assisting another to commit suicide and medical aid in dying are 
more difficult to deny.  Legislators may be willing to pass some kind of 
legislation, but it will likely be limited in scope and laden with safeguards 
experienced as obstacles. Current MAiD statutes exemplify this outcome. 
Cholbi’s perspective on nonprofits’ increasing the stigma associated 
with suicide is worth particular consideration because it suggests a path forward
that comports with aid-in-dying nonprofits’ long-term goals.  Cholbi believes 
that the emerging consensus of “anti-suicide but pro-assisted dying”
inadvertently “stigmatizes suicide in its effort to de-stigmatize assisted
dying.”305  He describes the rhetoric of aid-in-dying nonprofits as calling 
300. See Cholbi, supra note 27, at 2. 
301. Id. at 7. 
302. Id. at 2.  Yet, Cholbi contends, “There is . . . no significant disjunction between
the cases of assisted dying that this emerging consensus accepts and the cases of ‘suicide’ 
that it rejects.” Id. 
 303. Id. at 5 (“Properly understood, suicide and the seeking out of assisted dying . . . 
stand on a moral par, such that considerations that favor access to the latter militate equally 
strongly in favor of access to the former.”). 
304. Id. 
 305.  Id. at 5, 14. 
210
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for avoidance of “lump[ing] those who seek out physician-assisted dying 
with the suicidal [because it] will offend, hurt, and derogate those who take 
advantage of ‘death with dignity’ laws and their families.”306 He contends
that this approach increases the stigma of suicide and that stigmatizing suicide 
increases the prevalence of suicide: 
[T]here is good reason to suppose that stigmatization of suicide contributes to
its prevalence.  If Thomas Joiner’s theory of suicidal psychology is correct . . . ,
then this should not be surprising. For on Joiner’s theory, two of the main contributors
to suicidal thinking are a thwarted sense of belonging and a sense of being a 
burden to others.  It is not difficult to imagine suicidal persons reading Death
with Dignity’s [National Center] account of suicidal thinking and experiencing 
a sense of exclusion at learning that they, unlike their terminally ill brethren
seeking out medically assisted dying, are “impulsive” or “desperate” in wanting 
to die.307 
Increasing stigma associated with suicide hinders efforts to make medical 
aid in dying accessible because of obvious similarities between the thought 
processes and situations of those seeking medical aid in dying and those
seeking suicide. Cholbi carefully parses the alleged differences between
those two populations and finds no meaningful differences between them.
Both terminally ill and suicidal people are susceptible to depression and 
anxiety, value autonomy, seek to end life in expectation of poor quality of
life as much as existing poor quality of life, and are willing to use death
as a means to an end even though they may not actively “desire” or “intend”
to die. While acknowledging that the approach of aid-in-dying nonprofits 
has short-term political efficacy, he concludes nonetheless that “assisted
dying for the terminally ill is suicide tout court” and that “[p]roperly 
understood, suicide and the seeking out of assisted dying . . . stand on a 
moral par, such that the considerations that favor access to the latter militate 
equally strongly in favor of access to the former.”308 
Cholbi describes his own position as “anti-anti-suicide.”309  He contends 
that such a position is compatible with a society’s attempts to make aid in 
dying accessible—closing the gap between public support and legislative 
insufficiency—and to make suicide rare but safe and legal under some 
306. Id. at 7. 
307. Id. at 13–14 (footnote omitted) (citing Bernardo Carpiniello & Federica Pinna, 
The Reciprocal Relationship Between Suicidality and Stigma, 8 FRONTIERS PSYCHIATRY 
35 (2017)).
308. Id. at 5, 12. 
309. Id. at 14. 
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circumstances.310  The pathway to that goal includes reducing the stigma
associated with suicide, not fueling it. 
This approach of attempting to reduce stigma associated with suicide
has not been adopted by any American aid-in-dying nonprofit, but it may
hold more promise for the aid-in-dying movement than is currently appreciated.
What if destigmatizing suicide could lead to a more rational and compassionate
approach to each individual whose circumstances—whatever they are— 
has led that person to consider a life-ending act?  Imagine an individual
who approaches an aid-in-dying nonprofit for assistance with dying for 
reasons that could be addressable with appropriate guidance and support 
such that the person could lead a fulfilling life.  The individual feels comfortable 
talking about his or her reasons for wanting to die and expects to be heard 
respectfully because, after all, it is an aid-in-dying organization.  If, having
listened carefully to such an individual and with respect for the person’s 
autonomy, an aid-in-dying organization offers individualized information 
and assistance with realistic, viable alternatives to such a life-ending act, 
the person may be more inclined to listen to the suggestions because the 
organization has the lawful ability to offer them expert and professional 
assistance to end his or her life if warranted. 
Such aid-in-dying organizations may well be more successful in preventing 
suicide attempts than “anti-suicide” organizations.  Such organizations may
also build greater societal respect for individual autonomy at the end of life 
through destigmatizing suicide, even though not all suicides would be supported.
Greater respect for autonomy could be expected to result in greater societal
acceptance for medical aid in dying and increased legal access for those
suffering at the end of life.
This is not just an imaginary scenario; this orientation to treating suicide
attempt prevention seriously and individuals’ wish to die respectfully are
guiding ideas of Dignitas – To live with dignity – To die with dignity. Dignitas
is a Swiss nonprofit membership association known internationally for helping
irremediably suffering individuals to end their lives by self-administration 
of physician-prescribed medication.311 In fact however, Dignitas does
comprehensive advisory work with an aim to prevent suicide attempts, 
310. Id.
 311. FAQ, DIGNITAS, http://www.dignitas.ch/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=69&Itemid=136&lang=en [https://perma.cc/M2SQ-SP5Q]. The correct name
of this organization is as stated: Dignitas –To live with dignity – To die with dignity, which 
reflects the mission of the organization to help people to live with dignity if possible and, 
if not possible, to assist them lawfully to die, if the individual chooses.  Id.  The organization 
uses “Dignitas” as the short form of its name.  Id.  For more information about its focus on 
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including providing expert advice about palliative care and advance health
care planning. Dignitas is not primarily focused on providing “accompanied 
suicide.”312 
Like Dignitas, many American aid-in-dying nonprofits also provide assistance 
with advance health care planning and information about palliative care 
options.313  The difference lies in such organizations’ strenuous political 
rhetoric characterizing use of medical aid in dying as the polar opposite 
of suicide and not as a subset of suicide.  If Cholbi is correct, this will 
ultimately backfire because of inherent contradictions, such as respecting 
some individuals’ autonomy but not that of others similarly situated with 
respect to suffering and by increasing the stigma of suicide.  Increasing 
the stigma of suicide could result in increased willingness to prosecute in 
ambiguous cases of physician assistance, increased burdening of MAiD 
statutes with more requirements for both patients and physicians, increased 
enactment of anti-MAiD laws, and increasing suicide rates. 
B. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits and the Challenge of Respecting the 
Autonomy of Individuals Embedded in Social Networks 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits have agreed since the introduction of the first 
MAiD statutes that medical aid in dying should be available only to “qualified” 
patients. The list of qualifications is, in fact, quite long and accounts for 
much of the statutory detail in MAiD laws.314  These qualifications embody
the conceptual boundary between suicide and hastening a death that has 
already arrived on the near horizon.  They include a prognosis of death within 
six months and the absence of decision-hindering conditions, such as 
depression and cognitive deficiency.  They require verification of such 
312. FAQ, supra note 311. Dignitas uses “accompanied suicide” as the term for providing
medical aid in dying, which includes attending the death.  Id. 
 313. See, e.g., Advance Care Planning, END LIFE CHOICES CAL., https://endoflife 
choicesca.org/advance-care-planning [https://perma.cc/R4LR-5MJ6]; Advance Directives, 
COMPASSION & CHOICES, https://compassionandchoices.org/end-of-life-planning/plan/advance-
directives/ [https://perma.cc/D36G-G368]; Advance Directive, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https:// 
www.deathwithdignity.org/advance-directive/ [https://perma.cc/SGD9-4HB3]; Advance 
Directives, END LIFE WASH., https://endoflifewa.org/choices-and-planning/advance-directives 
[https://perma.cc/F2AB-EX89]; Benefits of Membership in Final Exit Network, FINAL EXIT 
NETWORK, http://www.finalexitnetwork.org/Benefits-of-Membership.html [https://perma.cc/
E5N9-C54A]; End of Life Liberty Project, supra note 26; End-of-Life Choices, END LIFE
WASH., https://endoflifewa.org/end-life-choices [https://perma.cc/G9RT-KY68]. 
314. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 443.1–.22 (West 2019). 
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qualifications, and failure to do so can result in loss of legal protection from
legal liability for homicide or for assisting another to commit suicide. 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits’ activism may be driven by political expediency, 
avoidance of the legal problems of assisting suicide, and provision of direct 
client services.  The desire to address severe, irremediable end-of-life suffering 
may heighten willingness to compromise in order to get something—anything 
remotely reasonable—passed. Moreover, aid-in-dying nonprofits must be 
concerned with the fact that patients are embedded in social networks.  
Consider that, if individual patient qualification were the only issue, one 
might as well argue that gun dealers should be able to sell guns to individuals 
they know to be interested in ending their lives, if those individuals are 
qualified to do so.  As a method of ending life, guns are highly effective315 
and less subject to the vagaries of individual physiology in response to
lethal doses of medication, particularly now that the gold standard for lethal 
prescription medications is difficult to obtain.316 
No existing aid-in-dying nonprofit would pursue liberalizing accessibility 
to guns as a rational and efficient means of assisting individuals suffering
at the end of life, even if it is, in some respects, no less radical than
liberalizing access to lethal doses of medication. One highly significant
reason for that is recognition that death is both individual and communal; 
how people die matters not only to the person who is dying but also to the 
people who love that person.  Dying after peacefully falling asleep—whether 
naturally or induced by an overdose of sedatives—seems ideal from the 
perspectives of many dying people and, also, the people who gather to 
offer support and to express their love.  In fact, Americans are increasingly 
turning away from isolated medicalized deaths and toward deaths coached
by “death doulas,” whose assistance respects that an individual’s death is 
important to a dying individual’s social network.317 
315. See Madeline Drexler, Guns and Suicide: The Hidden Toll, HARV. PUB. HEALTH, 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/magazine/magazine_article/guns-suicide [https://perma.cc/
M7KN-EEJW] (“[M]ore people in [the United States] kill themselves with guns than with
all other intentional means combined, including hanging, poisoning or overdose, jumping, 
or cutting.  Though guns are not the most common method by which people attempt suicide, 
they are the most lethal.  About 85 percent of suicide attempts with a firearm end in death.  
(Drug overdose, the most widely used method in suicide attempts, is fatal in less than 3 percent 
of cases.).”). 
316. See Taimie Bryant, Aid in Dying: The Availability of Ideal Medications for Use
in “Right to Die” Jurisdictions in the United States, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 705, 707, 711 
(2016) (discussing the legal problems associated with access to ideal barbiturates for aid 
in dying and possible solutions). 
317. Hermione Elliott, Opinion, Death Doulas Complement Nursing Care at the End 
of Life, NURSING TIMES (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.nursingtimes.net/hermione-elliott-
death-doulas-complement-nursing-care-at-the-end-of-life/5073875.article [https://perma.cc/
MP23-F7R2]; Deb Rawlings et al., What Role Do Death Doulas Play in End‐of‐Life Care? 
A Systematic Review, 27 HEALTH & SOC. CARE COMMUNITY, Aug. 2018, at e87, e90; see 
214
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Client service provision by aid-in-dying nonprofits includes attention to 
the medical details of dying and also, to the details of family and friends’ 
opportunity to be present during the dying process, if so desired.318  More
than death doulas, such organizations assist individuals in finding their
way through regulatory requirements, locating a willing physician and 
pharmacist, and safely self-administering the life-ending dose of medication.319 
Along the way, aid-in-dying nonprofits and patients come up against the 
reality that provision of a lethal dose of prescription medicines requires a 
physician knowingly to provide a lethal dose prescription and a pharmacist 
knowingly to fill it.  The autonomy of the physician and of the pharmacist 
come into play at that point, resulting in laws that are properly characterized 
as “physician protection (from prosecution)” laws or as patient “right to 
ask (for assistance)” laws rather than “right to die” laws. 
That people are embedded in social contexts is, perhaps, the greatest
gift to a dying person and also the greatest impediment to a straightforward 
legal realization of individual autonomy at the end of life.320  In addition
to those who support a dying individual’s choice to stop living for reasons 
centered on that person’s wellbeing and autonomy, individuals significant 
to the dying person may suggest for misguided or self-interested reasons 
that death is a good option.321  The U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. 
also Antonia Blumberg, A Growing Movement of ‘Death Doulas’ Is Rethinking How We 
Die: For End-of-Life Doulas, Accompanying the Dying Is Anything but Morbid, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 5, 2017, 8:44 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/end-of-life-doulas_n_ 
591cbce2e4b03b485cae51c2 [https://perma.cc/8VJF-NLAZ]; Ellen McCarthy, Dying Is 
Hard. Death Doulas Want To Help Make It Easier, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/dying-is-hard-death-doulas-want-to-help-make-it-
easier/2016/07/22/53d80f5c-24f7-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html?noredirect=on
&utm_term=.c033123be031 [https://perma.cc/5BE4-RX7W]; Alina Tugend, Doulas, Who 
Usher in New Life, Find Mission in Support for the Dying, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/your-money/death-doulas-help-the-terminally-ill-
and-their-families-cope.html [https://perma.cc/XM9N-J54P].  Nonprofit organizations also 
operate in this area. See About, INELDA, https://www.inelda.org/about [https://perma.cc/ 
3H9P-QHQ4] (“The International End of Life Doula Association (INELDA) is a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to bringing deeper meaning and greater comfort to dying people
and loved ones in the last days of life.”). 
318. E.g., Client Services, END LIFE CHOICES OR., https://eolcoregon.org/help-end-
life-choices-oregon/client-services [https://perma.cc/JC55-SG3U]. 
319. E.g., id.; About Us, supra note 86.
320. For a diagrammatic representation of the many social contexts and influences
in which seekers make decisions, see  Oliver, supra note 25, at 47 fig.1. 
321. Self-interest on the part of the one who “suggests” hastening death can take the 
form of desire for financial gain, as for example when an heir apparent is expecting an inheritance 
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Glucksberg identified states’ interest in protecting vulnerable individuals 
as a legitimate reason for limiting access to physician aid in dying,322 and 
states have in fact focused on vulnerability to others’ influence as a serious 
323concern. 
Is it possible to determine with sufficient certainty that the choice to end
life was, in fact, an individual’s own decision?  Sometimes it does not take
another’s explicit suggestion that death is a good choice; a person might 
adopt the perspective on one’s own that others would be “better off” if one
died sooner rather than later.  Surely, there can be financial, emotional, and 
physical challenges associated with caring for one who is approaching the 
end of life.  And surely, one suffering at the end of life can be aware and 
concerned about the extent of burden on loved ones.  Is this a type of
vulnerability against which the law should or could act?  What about 
vulnerability borne of a transient, addressable despair? 
MAiD statutes are crafted to reduce the possibility that a patient has been
unduly influenced by someone else or that the patient does not understand 
the consequence of a decision to consume a lethal dose of medication.  
Some require physicians to assess explicitly an individual’s reasons for 
using the aid-in-dying option and whether the decision was improperly 
influenced by other people.324  MAiD statutes’ inclusion of required waiting
that would be diminished by further medical care expenditures for the individual contemplating 
use of aid in dying.  Or, a self-interested person who supports another’s decision to hasten
death might want relief from financial expenditures on behalf of the dying individual.  There 
can also be other, nonfinancial, reasons.  For instance, in the case of State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 
the Minnesota Court considered particularly troubling facts: 
Posing as a depressed and suicidal young female nurse, Melchert-Dinkel responded 
to posts on suicide websites by Mark Drybrough of Coventry, England, and Nadia
Kajouji of Ottawa, Canada.  In each case, he feigned caring and understanding to win
the trust of the victims while encouraging each to hang themselves, falsely 
claiming that he would also commit suicide, and attempting to persuade them to
let him watch the hangings via webcam. 
844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014). 
322.  521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997). 
323. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 18, 22; see also Morris v. Brandenburg, 376
P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016) (providing Justice Chavez’s opinion, writing for the New Mexico 
Supreme Court, emphasizing that patient vulnerability to undue influence from others was 
an important reason for rejecting the idea that physician aid in dying falls within an individual’s 
constitutionally protected right of privacy).  Morris, 376 P.3d at 857 (concluding that one 
of the legal rationales behind the prohibition on assisting suicide was “the interest in protecting 
vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, 
and mistakes due to the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations 
or the desire of some to resort to physician aid in dying to spare their families the substantial 
financial burden of end-of-life health care costs”). 
324. See, e.g., Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR.REV.STAT. § 127.815 (2018) (attending 
physician responsibilities); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.820 (2018) (consulting physician confirmation); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2018) (counseling referral); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.830 (2018) 
216
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periods, multiple requests, and assessments of emotional and cognitive 
status are also included for this purpose.  Moreover, such requirements are
replicated in all new MAiD proposals, despite the fact no evidence of abuse 
of vulnerable people has occurred in states with MAiD statutes.325  The
concern remains great, and a lack of evidence does not mean that abuse 
is not occurring. 
Aid-in-dying nonprofits, whose mission is to secure access to aid in dying, 
have participated in crafting these requirements, although, objectively viewed,
such requirements limit patient autonomy to those who qualify under restrictive 
rules. Whether to seek passage of laws or in recognition of patient and 
physician circumstances, aid-in-dying advocates do not deny involvement 
in the creation of access limitations in MAiD, and some advocates say that
the access burdens now associated with MAiD statutes have gone too 
far.326  Numerous requirements burden patients, and fear of making a mistake
can plague physicians.  Indeed, the requirements are now so numerous that 
physicians may well hesitate to help a patient for fear of legal exposure 
resulting from failure to follow every requirement exactly.  In a legal
environment still hostile to the ideas of suicide and physician assistance, 
small errors might not be overlooked. Aid-in-dying nonprofits’ agreement 
that the Oregon statute should be used as a model in other jurisdictions has 
saddled progress in enacting medical aid-in-dying statutes with the weight 
of an increasing number of unwieldly rules.
The fact is that no aid-in-dying law, including a “physician’s best practices” 
model of access to physician assistance327—the Montana example—can 
eliminate all doubt about individual cases.  Even with multiple statutory 
requirements, MAiD statutes cannot fully address concerns about patient 
decision-making and other aspects of assisting a patient to die, even if the 
circumstances of patient suffering seem compelling.  Accordingly, a qualified 
(informed decision); see also  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5 (West 2019) 
(determinations required prior to prescription of aid-in-dying drug). 
325. Grube, supra note 170. 
326. E.g., Tucker, supra note 194, at 6; see also Sierra Hägg, Obstacles Surface Due 
to Hawai’i’s Aid-in-Dying ‘Safeguards,’  BIG ISLAND NOW (Apr. 11, 2019, 1:50 PM), http:// 
bigislandnow.com/2019/04/07/obstacles-surface-due-to-hawaiis-aid-in-dying-safeguards 
[https://perma.cc/Z935-NNR4]; Span, supra note 172  (“Many force the dying to navigate 
an overly complicated process of requests and waiting periods, critics say.”); Wiggins, supra 
note 174 (“Advocates said the changes imposed so many roadblocks that few, if any, doctors 
or patients would likely opt to take advantage of the bill even if it became law.”). 
327. See generally Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying: An End of Life-Option Governed by
Best Practices, 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 9 (2012). 
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patient may ask a physician for a lethal dose prescription, but a physician
may refuse without giving any reason.  A physician may wonder about the 
difficulty of assessing whether the patient’s request reflects a transient frame 
of mind, if the patient has been influenced by a self-interested person, such
as an heir apparent, to choose death, if the patient will regret the choice when
it is too late, if there would be inadvertent harm done to the patient’s immortal 
soul, or if the medication will be ingested as directed or work as expected. 
Some physicians might resist the idea that a physician’s role includes helping 
a patient to die or worry about their own immortal soul should they provide
the means for a patient to end his or her life.328  Ultimately, each patient, 
each physician, and each pharmacist must navigate individual autonomy 
in relationship to each other. 
Concern that a physician could be found legally culpable in a particular 
situation is a problem for physicians and patient access not only with regard 
to MAiD statutes.  It is also a challenge for FEN because its medical personnel 
evaluate whether a particular person qualifies for assistance, and it is also
a challenge for physicians and patients if a jurisdiction follows the example 
of Montana or allows physicians to prescribe lethal dose prescriptions as 
part of the “best practices” standard applied to physicians.  How does a 
physician know whether a particular patient’s situation would be adjudged
inappropriate for aid-in-dying?  In such a case, the physician could be prosecuted
for homicide and sued civilly for wrongful death.329  The physician could
also lose the license to practice medicine.330  The risk of these consequences
could be very low in the case of an individual dying patient whose family 
fully supports the physician’s decision to assist the patient by providing a 
lethal dose prescription, but if realized, the consequences would be extremely 
costly to the physician. Given the consequences of making an incorrect 
judgment, it is no wonder that a physician would be particularly reluctant 
to provide such a prescription without a longstanding relationship with the 
patient and evidence of the family’s supportive perspective.331  In an age
of managed care in which longstanding patients and physician relationships 
are increasingly rare,332 lethal dose prescriptions may be difficult to obtain. 
328. See generally ZITTER, supra note 16. 
329. Tucker, supra note 194, at 12–13, 18. 
330. Alan Blinder, Doctor Loses License over Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/us/doctor-loses-license-over-assisted-suicides. 
html [https://perma.cc/6UQL-DEQ6].
331. It is a patient’s family members who would be most likely to file a civil wrongful
death lawsuit, and so cautious physicians would be careful to keep records that document 
compliance with statutory requirements and would be interested in knowing whether family
members are supportive of the patient’s decision to hasten death. 
332. See John La Puma, Does the Doctor-Patient Relationship Mean More to Doctors 
than Patients?, MANAGED CARE MAG. (Jan. 1, 1996), https://www.managedcaremag.com/
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C. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits’ Role in the Context of Self-Administration 
of Life-Ending Medications 
Even if a physician concludes that an individual’s decision is autonomous, 
the physician can offer no more than a “do-it-yourself” approach to ending
life. Indeed, all American aid-in-dying nonprofits’ approaches share this 
characteristic of advocating for only a do-it-yourself means of ending 
one’s life.333  The only significant difference between FEN’s approach of
counseling individuals, on the one hand, and, on the other, the MAiD 
approach and the approach of including within a physicians’ best practices 
the option to provide lethal dose prescriptions is that the FEN approach 
does not necessarily include lethal doses of medication prescribed specifically 
for the purpose of  ending one’s life. 
All do-it-yourself methods carry some degree of risk of failure because 
they require individuals inexperienced at ending their lives to follow
instructions at a time they are the most impacted by illness and the 
circumstances leading to their desire to die sooner rather than “letting
nature take its course.” In this context of do-it-yourself ending of one’s 
life, an important role that aid-in-dying nonprofits can play is providing
knowledge important to the individual’s ease and success. For instance, 
to succeed in ending life, the prescribed lethal dose of medicine must be 
entirely ingested quickly;334 sitting for ingestion is also thought to help
avoid regurgitation, and certain other positions after the risk of regurgitation 
abates may help the medicine be more quickly effective.335  Experienced
aid-in-dying nonprofit volunteers attending a death can be watchful about 
such things, allowing family members to trust in the greater knowledge of 
the volunteers and to focus on their loved one’s transition. 
At the same time, attending a death and providing assistance may, in a
hostile sociocultural and legal environment, expose nonprofits to some risk
archives/1996/1/does-doctor-patient-relationship-mean-more-doctors-patients [https://perma.cc/
GLK8-9DFH].
333. Aleccia, supra note 169; Majchrowicz, supra note 82. 
334. According to Dr. Robert Wood of End of Life Washington Seattle, the lethal dose
of medication must be consumed within three to four minutes, before the person falls asleep 
and cannot finish the dose.  Interview with Robert W. Wood, Volunteer Med. Advisor, End of 
Life Wash., in Seattle, Wash. (May 29, 2015).  According to Dr. Judy Neall Epstein of End of 
Life Choices California, the advisable consumption period is 90–120 seconds, with the result 
that the individual falls asleep very quickly.  Interview with Judy Neall Epstein, President, 
End of Life Choices Cal. (Sept. 5, 2019). 
335.  Interview with Robert W. Wood, supra note 334. 
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of impermissibly assisting suicide.  In this regard, aid-in-dying nonprofits 
operating in states with MAiD statutes have the advantage that some
instances of medical aid in dying are legally approved, which could mean
less scrutiny of every detail of nonprofit assistance as the individual is 
dying. FEN does not have that advantage because it is assisting people in 
jurisdictions without MAiD or in MAiD jurisdictions that do not cover the 
specifics of the individual it is assisting.  There are no data about physicians
prescribing lethal dose prescriptions in Montana, which is the only jurisdiction 
explicitly allowing such prescriptions.  Accordingly, there are no data about
aid-in-dying nonprofits assisting patients who have received a lethal dose 
prescription from such a physician under a “best practices” model. 
D. Aid-in-Dying Nonprofits and the Future of Medical Aid in Dying
The role of aid-in-dying nonprofits is easy to state in relation to their 
mission statements: development of legal options for individuals irremediably
suffering at the end of life and education of those individuals and society
through client services, various programs, and legal advocacy.336  However,
they are actually playing quite broad roles in sociocultural ideas about 
suicide, relational autonomy of patients and physicians, the interplay of 
autonomy and vulnerability, and legal definitions of assisting suicide. 
Given the complexity of these ideas individually and their interrelationship,
it is difficult to predict how aid in dying will evolve in the United States.
Will the gap close between public support for access to aid in dying and 
actual access? If so, what direction will the United States take?  Will the
United States eventually develop laws such as those in Canada and the 
Netherlands, which allow physicians to provide euthanasia and self-
administered lethal doses of medication?337  If so, under what types of
restrictions, such as exclusion of minors suffering irremediably at the end 
of life?338  Will current MAiD statutes increase in number and utility over 
time? Or, will actual access to aid in dying be limited to white, educated 
336. E.g., About Us, supra note 86; Who Is the Final Exit Network (FEN), supra note 
63. 
337. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et. al., Attitudes and Practices of Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide in the United States, Canada, and Europe, 316 JAMA 79 (2016), https:// 
jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2532018 [https://perma.cc/MG69-JNHB] 
(surveying the legal status and data regarding practices and attitudes about euthanasia and 
assisted suicide in the United States, Canada, and Europe). 
338. See Scottie Andrew, Where Is Euthanasia Legal? Three Terminally Ill Minors 
Chose To Die in Belgium, New Report Finds, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2018, 4:26 PM), https:// 
www.newsweek.com/child-euthanasia-legal-belgium-three-minors-died-1061587 [https:// 
perma.cc/9UQ9-WQZR]; Marije Brouwer et al., Should Pediatric Euthanasia Be Legalized?,
2018 J. AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 141, 141, https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/141/
2/e20171343 [https://perma.cc/5BAU-2BE8]. 
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individuals339 or shrink under the weight of numerous requirements for 
access and provision of aid in dying?340  Given the complexity of the laws 
and social issues, such as the heavy stigma associated with suicide, Americans 
will continue to struggle with access to aid in dying for some time.  As 
long as that is true and as long as aid in dying takes the form of providing 
only do-it-yourself methods, aid-in-dying nonprofit organizations will 
continue to play important roles in shaping social and legal discourse about 
life, suicide, vulnerability, autonomy, and assistance to those suffering at 
the end of life. 
339. According to the most recent report in 2017 of the Washington State Department of
Health, 94% of those who died from ingestion of a lethal dose prescription issued in 
compliance with Washington’s MAiD law were white, and 75% had a minimum of some 
college education.  WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, WASHINGTON STATE: DEATH WITH 
DIGNITY ACT REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-
109-DeathWithDignityAct2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J44Z-XF3L].  Similarly, Oregon reported 
that 94.4% of those who used Oregon’s MAiD law were white and 69.5% had at least some 
college education. OR. HEALTH AUTH. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY 
ACT: 2017 DATA SUMMARY (2018), https://www.oregon.gov/oha/PH/PROVIDERPARTNER 
RESOURCES/EVALUATIONRESEARCH/DEATHWITHDIGNITYACT/Documents/
year20.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7DA-T9LR].
340. See Span, supra note 172. 
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